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The Supreme Court held in Koon v. United States that a sentencing
judge's decision to depart from the sentencing range authorized by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Professor Johnson argues that, to the extent the Court's opinion is
interpreted to require extremely deferential review of a sentencing judge's
decision to depart, it contradicts the role of appellate review envisioned by
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act, undermining the ability of appellate
courts to engage in the crucial law declaration and discretion control functionsP
that Congress intended. However, the abuse of discretion standard is
sufficiently malleable to permit the courts of appeals to remain faithfid to the
views of Congress as well as ftfill their institutional role by closely examining
the legal components of a sentencingjudge's decision to depart.
"The distinguishing feature of our criminal justice system is its insistence on
principled, accountable decisionmaking in individual cases. "I
"Today's message for sentencing judges is: Depart! Depart! Depart! Departures
are the lifeblood of the sentencing guidelines process. ",2
In Koon v. United States,3 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time
the proper standard of appellate review to be applied to a sentencing judge's
decision to impose a sentence outside the range of sentences permitted by the
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). The Court held
unanimously that such departures from the Guidelines are to be reviewed under
the "abuse of discretion" standard. 4 Both the Court's choice of the abuse of
discretion label and certain language in its opinion which emphasized the
discretion retained by the sentencing judge under the Guidelines system suggest
that Koon represents rejection of the appellate courts' prevailing approach to
*Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. J.D. University
of Michigan, 1988.
1 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2 Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE
L.J. 2053, 2070 (1992) (remarks of Judge Vincent L. Broderick).
3 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
4 Id. at 2047-48.
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departure review, 5 in favor of a dramatically more deferential process. 6 This
Article contends that to the extent Koon is so interpreted, it is fundamentally
inconsistent with the roles of departure and appellate review envisioned by
Congress in creating the Guidelines system. The Court's suggestions to the
contrary represent a flawed conception of federal Guidelines sentencing.
However, the departure review standard adopted in Koon may not be as
deferential as it may appear at first blush. The inherent malleability of the abuse
of discretion standard, and the lack of consistency in the Koon Court's own
application of the standard, both suggest that Koon permits appellate courts to
continue to analyze closely the propriety of sentencing judges' articulated
grounds for departure in most circumstances. Indeed, the emerging appellate
case law applying Koon suggests that some courts of appeals appreciate this,
although there is no consensus regarding the impact of Koon on the task of
appellate departure review.
This Article represents both a critique of the Court's analysis in Koon, and
an attempt to articulate a workable approach to departure review, given the
constraints imposed by that case. Part I provides background on the central
issues arising in Koon: first, the proper roles of departure and appellate review
in the Guidelines scheme, and second, the jurisprudence of standards of review.
Part II analyzes the Court's reasoning in Koon, describing the Court's
theory of the proper functions of departure and appellate review in light of its
analysis of the language and legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act,
as well as the Court's views about the institutional roles of district and appellate
courts in deciding mixed questions of fact and law. Part I1 also examines
whether abuse of discretion is a dramatically more deferential standard of
review than was the approach prevailing before Koon, and concludes that the
Court was not entirely clear on this point.
Part I critiques the Court's reasoning in Koon, challenging both the
evidence cited by the Court in support of its apparent conclusion that deferential
review of departure decisions is consistent with Congress's stated intent, and the
Court's application of its clearly distinguishable civil sanctions standards of
review jurisprudence to the departure review issue presented in Koon. Part ImI
also suggests that the Court's analysis is permeated by a flawed conception of
the Guidelines, and presents an alternative vision of the Guidelines which
highlights the potential damage to Congress's vision of sentencing reform
caused by excessively deferential review.
Part IV briefly examines contrasting appellate approaches to implementing
Koon, and urges the courts of appeals to take seriously their role in the
5 See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text for examples of appellate courts
employing a highly deferential approach to departure review as a result of Koon.
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Guidelines departure scheme by examining closely the legal components of the
"discretionr-y" decision to depart.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Roles of Departure and Appellate Review in the Guidelines
Scheme
1. Departure and the Guidelines
A complete description of the origins and function of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines is beyond the scope of this Article. 7 However, some
background is essential to understanding what was at stake in Koon.
Prior to adoption of the Guidelines system, federal judges possessed
extremely broad discretion in imposing sentences.8 Constrained only by
relatively broad, legislatively prescribed minimum and maximum sentences, 9
each judge was free to pursue her own preferred sentencing goals in individual
cases.1 0 Because individual judges held divergent views about proper
sentencing considerations," disparities in treatment of similarly situated offend-
7 For an excellent discussion of the background and legislative history of the Sentencing
Reform Act, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREsr L. REv. 223
(1993).
8 See id. at 225-26.
9 See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, I, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv.
679, 682 (characterizing pre-Guidelines judicial sentencing discretion as "virtually
unlimited").
10 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224
(noting lack of "comprehensive Federal sentencing law" to guide judges about appropriate
purposes of sentencing). This Senate Report is the principal legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act.
t 1According to the Senate Report:
A recent study indicates that Federal judges disagree considerably about the
purposes of sentencing. While one-fourth of the judges thought rehabilitation was an
extremely important goal of sentencing, 19 percent thought it was no more than
"slightly" important; conversely, about 25 percent thought "just deserts" was a very
important or extremely important purpose of sentencing, while 45 percent thought it was
only slightly important or not important at all.
Id. at41 n.18.
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ers resulted. 12
Increasing discontent about the perceived arbitrariness of this discretionary
sentencing regime eventually prompted a legislative response. 13 After a series
of fits and starts, this sentencing reform movement culminated in Congress's
1984 passage of the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA").14 The legislative history
of the SRA is clear: reduction in unwarranted sentencing disparity was "the
major premise of' this sentencing reform bill.15 To promote greater consistency
in sentencing, the SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission, and
authorized the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines. Consistent
with Congress's diagnosis of the problem-too much judicial discretion
resulting in unwarranted sentencing disparity-the guidelines system adopted in
the SRA is characterized by narrow sentencing ranges16 that generally are
binding on sentencing judges. 17
Congress recognized, however, that uniformity in sentencing could not be
12 See id. at 41-46 (citing research finding significant sentencing disparities in the
federal courts), 53 n.72 ("Recent studies indicate that sentences too often reflect the personal
attitudes and practices of individual sentencing judges."); see also Michael S. Gelacak et al.,
Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential
Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 306-07 (1996) (collecting studies establishing existence of
sentencing disparities under pre-Guidelines regime).
13 See Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 227-30 (describing the origins of congressional
sentencing reform efforts).
14 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1987.
15 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78. Congress also was concerned about promoting "honesty"
in sentencing. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsrAh L. REv. 1, 3 (1988). The principal means
to this goal was the abolition of parole. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 56-58.
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994), which provides:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum
of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by
more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the
range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
Some commentators refer to this provision as the 25 % rule. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 9,
at 691.
17 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (requiring sentencing judge to impose the sentence
authorized by the Guidelines, except in certain limited circumstances). Congress considered,
and rejected, an alternative proposal which would have created a system of non-binding,
advisory guidelines. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79 (explaining that Congress rejected an
amendment to make the guidelines more voluntary); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at
242-48 (describing evolution of Sentencing Reform Act from 1977 bill which would have
permitted appellate reversal only of those departure sentences found to be "clearly
unreasonable").
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pursued to the complete exclusion of other considerations. It granted to judges
the authority to "depart" from the Guidelines, in an effort to provide a safety
valve for unusual cases. The relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b),
provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [supplied
by the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described [by the Guidelines]. 18
In this way, Congress sought to preserve some discretion for judges to impose
sentences outside the Guidelines in unusual cases.
The legislative history of the SRA echoes the language of section 3553(b)
in emphasizing the relatively narrow scope of departure under section 3553(b).
Noting that "[a] primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of
unwarranted sentencing disparity," a Senate Report states that "the bill seeks to
assure that most cases will result in sentences within the guidelines range and
that sentences outside the guidelines will be imposed only in appropriate
cases." 19
The discretion of sentencing judges was further cabined by the SRA's
requirement that any departure must be accompanied by a statement of reasons
on the record justifying the departure.20 The legislative history emphasizes the
importance of the statement of reasons for departure sentences, both as a means
to discourage sentencing judges from resorting to departures in inappropriate
cases, 21 and as an aid to appellate review of departures. 22
The Commission implemented the statutory departure directive through the
general departure provisions of the Guidelines, which appear in sections 5K2.0
through 5K2.16 of the Guidelines Manual. Section 5K2.0 provides a general
description of the Commission's view on the appropriate use of departures. It
18 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
19 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (emphasis added).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1994) (stating that judges must provide "specific
reason[s]" for a sentence that falls outside the range required by the Guidelines).
21 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79 (explaining that the statement of reasons requirement
would highlight situations in which a judge "would have no adequate justification for
deviating from the recommended [sentencing] range," and this should be "sufficiently
important to dissuade a judge from deviating from a clearly applicable guideline range"). See
generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (1995)
(describing the "decision-disciplining function" of providing reasons for decisions).
22 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 80 (describing the statement of reasons as "especially
important" for appellate review of sentences outside the applicable guidelines range).
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tracks the general departure language Congress used in section 3553(b),
providing that a sentencing court may depart from the sentencing range
provided by the Guidelines "if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.'" 23 In fleshing out the
meaning of the departure provisions, the Commission characterized its view of
the proper role of departures in the following manner:
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as
carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that
each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a
particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs
from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 24
Because the Commission felt that it had accounted for most significant
sentencing factors, it believed that courts rarely would need to depart.25
2. Appellate Review and the Guidelines
Prior to adoption of the Guidelines, criminal sentences were, for all
practical purposes, unreviewable. 26 This feature of the sentencing landscape
was often criticized by proponents of sentencing reform, who suggested that the
absence of sentence review contributed significantly to the unpredictability and
unfairness of the sentencing process. 27
23 U.S. EENC]G GDELTU MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1997).
24 Id. § 1A4.(b).
25 See id. ("The Commission believes that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart
from the guidelines, they will not do so very often... because the guidelines, offense by
offense, seek to take account of those factors that the Commission's data indicate made a
significant difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice.").
26 See, e.g., United States v. Tcker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (stating that "a sentence
imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to
review").
27 See, e.g., MARVIN FRANKEL, CRImINAL SENTENcES: LAw WrrmouT ORDER 84
(1973) (urging appellate review as part of an effort to counter "the capricious unruliness of
sentencing"); PiERCE O'DoNNELL Er AL., TowARD A JusT AND EFFECrIVE SENTENCiNG
SYSrEm: AGENDA FOR LEG IsLATIvE REF oR 60 (1977) ("The arguments in favor of sentence
review, as propounded by scholars, legislators, and jurists, are overwhelming."); Robert J.
Kutak & Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of
Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463, 510 (1974) ("The record of the irrational or
disparate sentence is too well documented to be dismissed or put out of mind.. . . The
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Sentencing reform advocates touted appellate review as an important
ingredient in guidelines-based sentencing reform, advancing two major
rationales. First, such review would aid in control of the exercise of discretion
by sentencing judges. 28 Sentencing reformers viewed appellate review as
essential to correct the inevitable mistakes and errors of judgment that would
occur in implementing a new guidelines scheme.29
Second, and perhaps even more important, appellate review was conceived
as a crucial mechanism for promoting consistency and fairness by aiding in the
evolution of sentencing doctrine on which judges could rely when making
sentencing decisions. As one prominent group of commentators explained:
"[A]ppellate review, through articulation of legitimate reasons and standards for
sentencing, is an ideally suited institutional mechanism to upgrade-through the
gradual development of case law-the rationale and rationality of sentencing." 30
Appellate review of sentencing decisions was both a major innovation and a
central feature of the Sentencing Reform Act. The Act authorizes appeal of
sentences by either the defendant or the government if the sentence imposed
meets one of four criteria: (1) it was imposed "in violation of law"; (2) it was'
imposed "as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines";
(3) it was outside the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; or (4) it was
imposed for a sentence for which there was no applicable guideline and was
plainly unreasonable. 31
The scope of Guidelines sentence review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 is
limited. If the court of appeals concludes that the sentence was imposed in
violation of law or as the result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, it
is required to remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 32
Similarly, if the court concludes that the sentence is outside the applicable
Guidelines sentencing range and is "unreasonable," it is required to set aside
inquiry is not whether there should be a system of appellate review, but rather how that
system should be established and what form it should take.").
28 See O'DoNNELLEr AL, supra note 27, at 60.
29 See id. (noting that appellate review provides a mechanism to correct the "grossly
excessive" sentences that are possible even under a guidelines system). See generally Henry
J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 756-58 (1982) (describing
purposes and benefits of appellate review).
30 O'DoNNmEL Er AL., supra note 27, at 60; see also FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 84
("One way to begin to temper the capricious unruliness of sentencing is to institute the right of
appeal, so that appellate courts may proceed in their accustomed fashion to make law for this
grave subject.") (emphasis added).
31 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (1994).
32 See id. § 3742(0(1).
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the sentence and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 33 In all
other circumstances, the appellate court is to affirm the sentence. 34 The SRA
does not permit appellate review of a sentence within the Guidelines range. 35
Nor does it permit review of a sentencing judge's discretionary decision not to
depart from the Guidelines range. 36
These limitations on the scope of appellate review were designed to
preserve some degree of autonomy for sentencing judges in implementing the
Guidelines.37 On the other hand, while Congress created a structure within
which sentencing judges retained significant discretion, it simultaneously
emphasized the importance of appellate review to limit that discretion, in order
to help promote greater consistency in sentencing.38
3. Intersection: Appellate Review of Departure Decisions
Koon was not the first Supreme Court case to address appellate review of
decisions to depart under the Guidelines. In Williams v. United States,39 the
Court granted certiorari to determine whether an appellate court could, based
on its own assessment of the "reasonableness" of a departure sentence, affirm
33 See id. § 3742(f)(2). This section also provides that if there is no applicable guideline
for the offense, the appellate court may set aside the sentence only if it is "plainly
unreasonable." Id.
34 See id. § 3742(f)(3).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554-55 (2d Cir. 1989)
(characterizing as "a conscious decision consistent with its overall purpose" Congress's
refusal in § 3742 to provide for appellate review of a sentence that is within a correctly
calculated guidelines range).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1990) (following
other circuits in holding that § 3742 "precludes appellate review of a district court's
discretionary refusal to depart" from the sentencing range specified by the Guidelines). The
courts carefully distinguish between such discretionary refusals to depart and a sentencing
judge's erroneous determination that departure is not permitted under the circumstances of the
case, which is reviewable as an incorrect application of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United
States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462,
473 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[A]ppellate jurisdiction may attach if it appears that the failure to depart
stemmed from the district court's mistaken impression that it lacked the legal authority to
deviate from the guideline range ....").
37 See S. Rip. No. 98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333.
38 See id. (stating that appellate review was designed to guide and control sentencing
judges' discretion in order to "promote fairness and rationality, and to reduce unwarranted
disparity, in sentencing").
39 503 U.S. 193 (1992).
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such a sentence that had been based on both valid and invalid factors.40 The
Court held that such an affirmance is impermissible. 41 Central to this holding
was the Court's conclusion that reliance on invalid departure factors is "an
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines" within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). 42 The Court expressly rejected the dissent's view that
section 3742(0(2) provides the exclusive vehicle for departure review.43
Williams thus interpreted the SRA as creating a two-tiered approach to
departure review. The appellate court must first determine whether the
sentencing judge's basis for departure was valid. In assessing the validity of the
basis for departure, the court must consider the relevant guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Commission. 44 If the court
determines that the basis for departure is invalid, and that the sentence would
have been different but for the sentencing judge's reliance on the invalid
departure factor, the court must vacate the sentence and remand. 45
40 Id. at 198. In Williams, the sentencing judge had departed from the applicable range
of 18-24 months of imprisonment. The judge imposed a sentence of 27 months, finding that
Williams's Criminal History Category ("CHC") understated the seriousness of his past
criminal history. See id. at 196-97 (citing U.S. SENTEN CNG GumiuEsw MANuAL § 4A1.3
(1991)). In concluding that Williams's CHC underrepresented the seriousness of his past
criminal conduct, the sentencing judge noted that: (1) two previous convictions were too old
to be counted in the calculation of Williams's CHC; and (2) several prior arrests could not be
included in calculating the CHC. See id. at 196. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that while it was permissible to depart based on convictions too remote
in time to be part of the CHC calculation, it was impermissible to depart on the basis of prior
arrests. See id. at 197. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the departure sentence, holding
that a departure based on both valid and invalid factors could be affirmed if the resulting
departure was "reasonable" in light of the valid factors standing alone, and that the sentence
in Williams met this reasonableness standard. See id. at 197-98.
41 See id. at 203.
42 Section 3742(0(1) requires the appellate court to remand any sentence imposed "as a
result of an incorrect application" of the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (1994) (emphasis
added). This causal connection requirement permits the appellate court to engage in a
harmless error analysis, but not to uphold a departure sentence on its own assessment of the
reasonableness of that sentence. In other words, the Court instructed appellate courts to
remand any case in which the sentencing judge appeared to rely on an invalid departure
factor, unless the appellate court concludes that the sentencing judge "would have imposed the
same sentence had it not relied upon the invalid factor or factors." Williams, 503 U.S. at 203.
4 3 See Williams, 503 U.S. at 200-01. Section 3742(f)(2) authorizes the appellate court to
set aside a sentence and remand only if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range and is
unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2) (1994). Under the dissent's view, if the appellate
court concludes that the departure sentence is "reasonable," it must affirm the sentence. See
Williams, 503 U.S. at 208-409 (White, J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44 See Williams, 503 U.S. at 202.
4 5 See id. at 202-03.
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If, however, the appellate court concludes that the basis for departure is
valid, it then proceeds to the second step of the departure analysis-determining
whether the resulting sentence is unreasonable.46 This determination focuses on
the direction and extent of the departure in light of the sentencing court's
articulated grounds for departure. The Wi/iamf Court emphasized that this two-
tiered departure review flowed inextricably from the review scheme set up by
Congress; this interpretation of the review process is the only one consistent
with the language of section 3742.47 This approach also makes sense as a policy
matter. It acknowledges a need for a more searching review of the decision to
depart, a decision which depends upon interpretation of the Guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary, while reserving a more limited "reasonableness"
review for the inherently more discretionary determination of how much to
depart from the applicable Guidelines range.
B. Standards of Appellate Review
By definition, appellate courts do not work with a clean slate. The task of
the appellate courts is limited to reviewing the decisions of the trial courts. The
performance of this task is governed by standards of review, which "define the
depth or intensity with which trial court rulings of fact, law, and discretion are
subjected to review." 48 In other words, standards of review guide the appellate
court by indicating how much deference is to be accorded the lower court's
determinations on a given issue. These standards occupy a continuum of
degrees of deference, ranging from no review at all, through such deferential
standards as review for abuse of discretion and review for clear error,49 to
plenary, or de novo review.50 In addition to aiding the appellate court in
determining how deferentially to review lower court determinations, standards
of review allocate decision-making authority between trial and appellate
46 See id.
47 See id. at 202 (reading § 3742 to require two-tiered review is necessary "in order to
give full effect to both [§ 3742()(1) and § 3742(f)(2)]").
48 j. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47 LAW &
CONrTMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (Spring 1984).
49 See Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REv.
1, 5-7 (1991). Professor Sward characterizes the abuse of discretion standard as more
deferential than the clearly erroneous standard, although she notes that the precise distinction
between the two is somewhat elusive, and her characterization of the relative deference each
represents "may be more intuitive than scientific." Id. at 7 n.18; see also Martha S. Davis, A
Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REv. 469, 480 (1988)
(characterizing abuse of discretion review as "the most deferential standard of review
available with the exception of no review at all").
50 See Sward, supra note 49, at 5-7.
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courts-the trial court's effective authority is expanded to the extent deferential
review standards are employed, while the appellate court's effective authority is
expanded through less deferential appellate review.51
Determining the proper standard of review thus is critical, not only to the
litigants who need to understand the contours of appellate review, but also to
the legal system itself for the proper allocation of authority and resources.52
Despite the importance of standards of appellate review, determining what
standards apply to what types of questions has been notoriously difficult.53 As
the Supreme Court has noted, in the absence of legislative guidance or long-
standing historical practice providing clear guidance about the standard of
review in a particular context, "it is uncommonly difficult to derive from the
pattern of appellate review of other questions an analytical framework that will
yield the correct answer." 54
Two areas relevant to this Article have created particularly vexing
problems in determining the proper standards of review: first, mixed questions
of fact and law, and second, review of district court decisions that are in some
sense "discretionary." Mixed questions have been defined as those in which
"the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it
another way, whether the rule of law as applied to established facts is or is not
violated." 55 Courts have been unable to articulate clear rules about the proper
review standards to be applied to mixed questions.56 In recent years, the
51 See Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 243.
52 See STEVEN ALAN CnDRSS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REvImw § 1.01, at 1-2 (1992) (noting that standards of review have real impacts in appellate
decisionmaking and thus "cannot be dismissed as sheer politics").
53 The standard of review to be applied to some determinations has long been settled. It
is clear, for example, that findings of fact are reviewed under the deferential clearly erroneous
standard, see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), while conclusions of law are reviewed under the non-
deferential de novo standard. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir.
1984) (en banc). Much more problematic are the standards to be applied to mixed questions of
fact and law. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
54 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
55 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). In Swint, the Court
addressed the proper standard of review to be applied to deciding whether a union seniority
system that had a disparate impact on minorities was created with an intent to discriminate.
The Court held that intent to discriminate was a "pure question of fact," not a mixed question,
and thus should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 287-90.
56 See, e.g., McConney, 728 F.2d at 1200 (characterizing standard of review
jurisprudence as being in a "pervasive" state of "disarray"); Sward, supra note 49, at 34
(noting that the line between mixed questions reviewed deferentially and those reviewed
independently is "highly fluid," and this area of the law is "fraught with pitfalls").
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Supreme Court has adopted a loose, functional analysis to determine whether a
mixed question is to be treated as one of law or fact for appellate review
purposes. 57
Similar problems have arisen where the trial court determination to be
reviewed entails a mix of legal, factual and discretionary elements. 58 Appellate
courts have long recognized that certain types of decisions call for choices from
a range of permissible options. Such judgment calls are reviewed under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. 59 Common examples include certain
litigation procedure and docket management determinations such as whether to
hold separate trials, or to grant a new trial, or to permit certain types of
discovery. These judgment calls nevertheless are informed by considerations of
general applicability, or legal standards, that are part of the appellate court's
law declaration function.60 Characterizing the review of legal determinations
wrapped in discretionary decisions creates some difficult problems which are
explored later in this Article. 61
57 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (observing that proper
characterization of mixed questions "has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question").
5 8 See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398-405 (1990)
(involving application of Rule 11 sanctions); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558-60 (involving award of
fees and expenses to party prevailing against the United States under the Equal Access to
Justice Act); see also CmDREss & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.01 at 4-6 ("[D]eciding when
review should fall under an abuse of discretion standard (rather than applying a de novo
standard of review as a legal matter) can be as difficult as fundamentally sorting discretion
from law.").
59 See CHLRn'SS & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.01 at 4-2 to 4-3.
Many decisions made by the district judge in orchestrating a bench or jury trial before
him-or in more broadly supervising his docket, the litigation process, and the general
operation of the district court-involve a certain measure of judgment or on-the-scene
presence. These decisions are classified generally as discretionary and are deferred to,
within limits, on appeal .... Abuse of discretion is the catchphrase usually recited as the
standard of review over such discretionary choices.
Id.
60 See id. § 4.01, at 4-3; see also Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir.
1983) ("It is not inconsistent with the [abuse of] discretion standard for an appellate court to
decline to honor a purported exercise of discretion which was infected by an error of law.").
61 See infra Part Il.C (exploring the ambiguity of the abuse of discretion standard).
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C. Determining the Standard of Review of Departure Decisions: The
Experience of the Courts of Appeals
Prior to the Court's decision in Koon, the courts of appeals had reached a
near consensus about the appropriate standard of review to be applied to
departures from the Guidelines. An early articulation of that standard appears in
United States v. Diaz-Villafane,62 in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit characterized departure review as a three step process:
First, we assay the circumstances relied on by the district court in
determining that the case is sufficiently "unusual" to warrant departure. That
review is essentially plenary: whether or not circumstances are of a kind or
degree that they may appropriately be relied upon to justify departure is, we
think, a question of law.
Second, we determine whether the circumstances, if conceptually proper,
actually exist in the particular case. That assessment involves factfinding and
the trier's determinations may be set aside only for clear error.
Third, once we have assured ourselves that the sentencing court
considered circumstances appropriate to the departure equation and that those
factors enjoyed adequate record support, the direction and degree of departure
must, on appeal, be measured by a standard of reasonableness. 63
In effect, Diaz-Villafane treats the sentencing judge's departure decision as
involving three distinct processes, each of which is subject to a different
standard of review: first, legitimacy of the basis for departure is reviewed de
novo; second, factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and third, the
direction and degree of departure is reviewed highly deferentially under what
amounts to an abuse of discretion standard. 64
Diaz-Villafane proved to be very influential. By the time Koon was argued,
eleven of the twelve courts of appeals hearing Guidelines cases had adopted
62 874 F.2d 43 (lst Cir. 1989).
63 Id. at 49-50. The court took special care to emphasize that this third inquiry must take
place with "full awareness of, and respect for," the sentencing court's "superior 'feel' for the
case." Id. at 50; see also Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Emnination of Emerging
Depature Jurispnidence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NoRE DAME L. REv.
1, 39-40 (1991) (discussing the appellate courts' deferential review of decisions involving
direction and degree of departure).
64 See United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 1990) (following departure
review approach similar to that used in Diaz-Villafane, but characterizing the reasonableness
review as abuse of discretion review); see also Selya & Kipp, supra note 63, at 18-19 (stating
that "appellate review must take into account the source of the lower court's determination:
whether it arises from an exercise of discretion, a finding of fact, or a conclusion of law")
(emphasis added).
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some version of that standard. 65 Ironically, only the First Circuit then deviated
from this approach, overruling Diaz-Villafane in favor of a more deferential
standard of review in United States v. Rivera.66
Because Rivera foreshadows Koon, it is worthy of discussion. Rivera first
canvassed the basic statutory framework of the departure provisions,
emphasizing the statutory directive to sentencing judges to impose a sentence
within the Guidelines range in the usual case.67 The court then examined the
impact of the Guidelines themselves on this statutory departure scheme, placing
potential departure situations in four categories, which are derived from the
nature of the Commission's treatment of the issue before the court: (1) cases
outside the "heartland"; (2) encouraged departures; (3) discouraged departures;
and (4) forbidden departures.68
The first category is the prototypical unusual case, involving some relevant
feature not expressly addressed in the Guidelines. 69 This "heartland" concept
embodies the recognition that the Commission could not anticipate every
possible relevant sentencing factor as it might apply to every possible case.
Thus, the sentencing judge remains free to take into consideration otherwise
unaccounted-for factors. 70
65 See, e.g., United States v. Fierro, 38 F.3d 761, 775 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Griffin, 945 F.2d 378, 380-81 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d
745, 746 (9th Cir. 1991) (en band), overruled by United States v. Beasley, 90 F.3d 400 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1110-11 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Lam, 905 F.2d 599,
602-03 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 66-67 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276,.277-78 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bums, 893
F.2d 1343, 1345 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 129 (1990); United States v.
Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059,
1067 (6th Cir. 1989).
66 994 F.2d 942, 950-52 (1st Cir. 1993).
67 See id. at 946-47 ("The upshot, as we have said, is that in ordinary cases the district
court must apply the Guidelines. In other cases, the court may depart provided that it gives
reasons for the departure and that the resulting sentence is 'reasonable.'").
68 Id. at 947-48.
69 See supra text accompanying note 24 (describing the Commission's "heartland"
language).
70 For example, in United States v. Kikuwura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), the court
held that a substantial upward departure would be permissible for a defendant convicted of
several explosives and passport offensis, on the ground that the defendant was planning a
series of major terrorist bombings. This took the case out of the heartland of the typical
offense encompassed in the applicable explosives and passport offense guidelines. Id. at
1104-09.
In United States v. Restrepo, 936 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1991), the court affirmed downward
departures for several defendants playing minimal roles in a huge money laundering scheme.
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The second category, encouraged departures, encompasses the set of
factors specified by the Commission as taking the case out of the "heartland" of
the applicable guideline. For example, Part 5K of the Guidelines lists a host of
offense and offender characteristics, such as use or possession of a dangerous
weapon or instrumnentality, 71 coercion or duress,72 or the offender's diminished
capacity,73 that in the Commission's view may warrant departure. Similarly,
particular guidelines provisions may contain encouraged departure factors. 74
The third category, discouraged departures, includes those offender
characteristics listed in Part 5H of the Guidelines, that the Commission has said
are "not ordinarily relevant" in determining whether to depart.75 These include
such factors as the offender's age,76 education and vocational skils,77 mental
and emotional condition,78 family ties and responsibilities, 79 and past military,
charitable or civic contributions.80 Because the Commission has discouraged,
but not absolutely forbidden, use of these factors, the district court must
determine whether such a factor is present to such a degree as to make the case
an "extraordinary" one. Finally, there are a few factors, such as race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, 8' as well as lack of
guidance as a youth,82 that the Commission has prohibited sentencing judges to
use in support of departures.
This classification scheme underlies the court's evaluation of the
The sentencing judge found these defendants to be unusually situated because their sentences
were magnified well beyond the extent of individual culpability due to the impact of the
amount of money laundered in the scheme as a whole. The Second Circuit concluded:
"[Wlhere, as here, an offense level has been extraordinarily magnified by a circumstance that
bears little relation to the defendant's role in the offense, a downward departure may be
warranted on the ground that minimal participation exists to a degree not contemplated by the
guidelines." Id. at 667.
71 See U.S. SETMCING GUIDEuNus MANUAL § 5K2.6 (1997).
72 See id. § 5K2.12.
73 See id. §5K2.13.
74 For example, the application notes to § 2Ll.1, the Guidelines section which governs
sentences involving the smuggling, transporting or harboring of illegal aliens, specify that
"[i]f the offense involved substantially more than 100 aliens, an upward departure may be
warranted." Id. § 2L1.1 application note 4.
75 Id. ch. V, pt. H introductory commentary.
76 See id. § 5Hl.1.
77 See id. § 5111.2.
78 See id. § 5H1.3.
79 See id. § 5H-1.6.
80 See id. § 5HL11.
81 See id. § 5H1.10.
82 See id. § 5H1.12.
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"partnership" between the district and appellate courts as their respective roles
bear on the standard of appellate review. 83 Rivera suggests that plenary review
is appropriate in assessing whether particular circumstances relied upon by the
district court are of the "kind" the Guidelines permit as a basis for departure.84
The court emphasized that this type of determination is a "quintessentially
legal" one, with respect to which the district court possesses no special
competence.8 5 On the other hand, the court suggested that departures often turn
on "a judgment about whether the given circumstances, as seen from the
district court's unique vantage point, are usual or unusual, ordinary or not
ordinary, and to what extent. "86 The court suggested that district courts do
possess special competence with respect to these fact-intensive "heartland"
evaluations, and found it appropriate to extend the deference accorded district
court determinations of fact and of "direction and degree" under Diaz-Villafane
to these determinations as well.87
Rivera clearly is designed to accord greater deference to certain types of
departure determinations. Note, however, that the Rivera court did not
characterize this approach as a dramatic break with previous departure review
case la*, 88 nor did it deny that evaluation of the structure and theory of both
relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole should guide
the district court in its departure decisions. Such determinations have a
substantial "legal" component in that they can meaningfully be reviewed by a
court of appeals. 89 Thus, Rivera is best seen as an effort to provide some
additional "leeway" to district courts in making judgments about the
"unusualness" of particular cases; 90 it did not represent an abandonment of
appellate evaluation of the grounds for departure in light of relevant structural
guidance provided by the Guidelines.
83 United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1993).
84 Id. at 950-51.
85 1d. at 951.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 951-52.
88 See United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating thai
departure review is governed by the three-step process that was set forth in Diaz-Villafane,
and "refined" by Rivera); see also Wendy J. Thurm, The First Circuit: Everything Old is
New Again, 7 Fed. Sent. Rep. (Vera Inst. of Justice) 227 (1995) (reviewing First Circuit
departure case law and concluding that Rivera did not substantially change departure review).
89 See, e.g., United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1323-24 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing
a downward departure that was based on the defendant's history of charitable and community
service on the ground that the sentencing judge erred in evaluating the "extraordinariness" of
the defendant's service exclusively by comparison to other bank robbers).
90 Rivera, 994 F.2d at 950-51.
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN KooN V. UNTED STATES
A. The Facts
Koon arose from the infamous videotaped beating of Rodney King by Los
Angeles police officers that occurred after a high speed chase on the streets and
freeways of the Los Angeles area.9 1 After the State of California failed to
obtain convictions against the officers in state court on charges of assault with a
deadly weapon and use of excessive force, 92 federal authorities charged several
officers, including petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, with
criminal violations of King's constitutional rights.93 Koon and Powell were
convicted. 94
In calculating the defendants' sentences under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court concluded that the applicable Guidelines
Sentencing Range, or "GSR," for each defendant was seventy to eighty-seven
months imprisonment. 95 The district court, however, decided to impose a
91 See United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 775 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035
(1996).
92 See Four Officers Not Guilty in King Beating, UPI, Apr. 29, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (criminalizing willful "deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution" by one acting "under
color of any law").
94 Two other officers, Ted Briseno and Timothy Wind, also were charged. The jury
acquitted Briseno and Wind. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
95 See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 779-85. The Guidelines employ a matrix, with the
applicable sentencing range derived from an intersection of the defendant's "Offense Level"
and "Criminal History Category." See U.S. SENTENciNG GUIDanus M~Au L ch. V, pt. A
(1997) (Sentencing Table). The Offense Level, represented by the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table, is calculated by determining the defendant's "Base Offense Level," which
is derived from the offense of conviction, and adjusting that Base Offense Level in light of
various indicators of the real offense conduct and other adjustments noted in Chapter Three of
the Guidelines Manual. The Criminal History Category is based on the number and
seriousness of the defendant's sentences for prior convictions. See id. (Commentary to
Sentencing Table).
The court concluded that each offender's total Offense Level was 27. The Base Offense
Level for a § 242 violation was six plus the offense level for the appropriate underlying
offense, aggravated assault. See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 780. The Base Offense Level for
aggravated assault was 15. See id. at 781. This, in tam, was adjusted upward four levels for
use of a dangerous weapon, and another two levels for infliction of bodily injury, resulting in
a total Offense Level of 27. See id. at 781-83. Both Koon and Powell were first-time criminal
1998] 1713
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
downward departure of five levels because the victim's (Mr. King's) wrongful
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior. 96 The court
imposed an additional three level downward departure, based on a combination
of four factors:97 the likelihood that the defendants would face serious abuse in
prison;98 the defendants' loss of employment and collateral emotional strain
associated with such loss;99 the significant burden on the defendants from
successive state and federal prosecutions; 00 and the absence of a need for
lengthy incarceration to incapacitate the defendants for public protection.' 01
The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the government cross-appealed the sentences
imposed. 10 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the convictions 10 3 and the district
court's calculation of the applicable GSRs. 1' 4 The court, applying a de novo
standard of review to the district court's decisions to depart, 105 reversed each of
the departures.' 0 6
offenders, placing them in Criminal History Category I. According to the Sentencing Table, a
total Offense Level of 27 and Criminal History Category I results in a range of 70-87 months.
See U.S. SENTENcING Gummms MAUAL ch. V, pt. A (1997) (Sentencing Table).
96 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K2.10 (1997) (providing that the
sentencing judge may depart if "the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to
provoking the offense behavior").
97 The district court emphasized that none of the four factors, taken individually, would
have justified a departure. Rather, departure was justified on the basis of the synergistic effect
of the factors taken together. See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 785. See generally United States v.
Cook, 938 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir. 1991) (permitting departure based on a combination of
factors).
98 The court explained that the "widespread publicity and emotional outrage"
surrounding the case suggested that Koon and Powell were "particularly likely to be targets of
abuse" in prison. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 788.
99 See id. at 798.
10 See id. at 790.
101 See id.
102 See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
103 See id. at 1462.
104 See id. at 1461-62.
105 See id. at 1451 (citing United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.
1991) (en banc)). Lira-Barraza employed the three-step standard of review popularized by
Diaz-Wllafane, in which the validity of the basis for departure is subject to de novo review.
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
106 See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1452-60.
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B. Why Abuse of Discretion?: The Court's Reasoning
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine the standard of review
governing appeals from a district court's decision to depart from the sentencing
ranges in the Guidelines." 107 Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court
on this issue,' 08 rejected the tripartite standard of review employed by the Ninth
Circuit, in favor of what he characterized as a "unitary abuse-of-discretion
standard." 09 Two themes were central to Justice Kennedy's reasoning: first,
Congress, in creating the Guidelines scheme, intended that sentencing judges
retain substantial discretion, an intention best executed through deferential
review of departures; second, notions of institutional comparative advantage
traditionally used by the Court in determining the proper standard of appellate
review favored the more deferential abuse of discretion review.
1. Congressional Guidance Regarding Standard of Review
The Court's adoption of an abuse of discretion standard was influenced
heavily by its conclusion that Congress intended in the Sentencing Reform Act
to create a limited appellate role, preserving a significant degree of the trial
judge's traditional sentencing discretion." 0 The Court cited several sources in
support of its assessment of congressional intent. First, it relied heavily on
language added by Congress in 1988 to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) which requires
courts of appeals to "give due deference to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts.""' The Court implied that one could infer from this
107 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2043 (1996).
108 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer all agreed with the Court's analysis on
the standard of review, but dissented for various reasons from the majority's application of the
standard. See id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Souter,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2056 (Breyer, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Id. at 2047-48.
110 See id. at 2046-47. It explained:
We agree that Congress was concerned about sentencing disparities, but we are just
as convinced that Congress did not intend, by establishing limited appellate review, to
vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing decisions.
Indeed, the text of § 3742 manifests an intent that district courts retain much of their
traditional sentencing discretion.
Id. at 2046.
111 As originally enacted in 1984, § 3742 provided: "The court of appeals shall give due
regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and
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"due deference" language an intent to limit the intensity of appellate review. 112
At least one commentator previously defended a similar inference, arguing that
abuse of discretion review was the standard most consistent with this due
deference language. 113 Second, the Court cited language from the principal
legislative history of the SRA, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, which
provided that "the discretion of a sentencing judge has a proper place in
sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate
court." 114 Finally, the Court quoted the following language from Wil/iams v.
United States: 115
Although the [Sentencing Reform] Act established a limited appellate review of
sentencing decisions, it did not alter a court of appeals' traditional deference to
a district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion... . The development of
the guideline sentencing regime has not changed our view that, except to the
extent specifically directed by statute, "it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness
of a particular sentence."1 16
In short, the Court concluded from the due deference language, legislative
history and case law that Congress created a regime of limited appellate review
and substantial residual discretion for sentencing judges. 117 From this
conclusion, the Court inferred a congressional purpose to create a deferential
shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous." 18
U.S.C. § 3742(d) (Supp. 1111985). The language now reads:
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court
unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's
application of the guidelines to the facts.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
112 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046.
113 See, e.g., Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. Rv. 621, 634-39 (1992) (arguing that Congress did not intend to
confer de novo review upon courts of appeals, and that the "due deference" language of
§ 3742(e) "makes the most sense when treated like the abuse-of-discretion standard rather
than like de novo review").
114 S. REp. No. 98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333.
115 503 U.S. 193 (1992).
116 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046 (quoting Williams, 503 U.S. at 205).
117 See id. at 2046.
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standard of review of departure decisions.118
2. Institutional Considerations
Recognizing that the SRA did not expressly resolve the standard of review
question,119 the Court supplemented its interpretation of the SRA with a
functional analysis of departure review, concluding that district courts have an
"institutional advantage over appellate courts" in making departure decisions
which counsels in favor of a deferential abuse of discretion standard.1 20 Its
characterization of the sentencing judge's departure inquiry was critical to this
analysis. In the Court's view, the sentencing judge's central task in determining
whether departure is permissible is to decide whether the case involves
circumstances unusual enough to take it out of the heartland of cases governed
by the relevant guidelines, a task which necessarily requires comparison to the
facts of other pertinent Guidelines cases. 121 Viewed from this perspective, the
Court suggested that sentencing judges possess two significant institutional
advantages over appellate courts in making these determinations. First, the
sentencing judge's proximity to the day-to-day operations of the Guidelines
provided a basis for comparison appellate courts lack, because appellate courts
see only a fraction of Guidelines cases.1 22
Second, the Court expressed the belief that because the departure inquiry
requires "the consideration of unique factors that are 'little susceptible... of
useful generalization," 1 23 de novo review is "'unlikely to establish clear
guidelines for lower courts."' 124 Under the functional standards of review
analysis employed by the Court in previous cases, this lack of generalizability
of departure principles suggests the need for deferential appellate review.
Specifically, the Court analogized departure review to the Rule 11 sanctions
and Equal Access to Justice Act attorney's fees determinations which it had
addressed before in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.125 and Pierce v.
118 See id. A key step in the Court's reasoning is its characterization of the sentencing
judge's decision to depart as one which "embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a
sentencing court." Id.
119 See id. (acknowledging that while Congress's intent to create a scheme of limited
appellate review was clear, the standard of review Congress intended appellate courts to
employ was not).
120 Id. at 2047.
121 See id. at 2046-47.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 2047 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)).
124 Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405).
125 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
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Undenvood,126 respectively.
C. Applying the Standard. The Ambiguities of Koon's Abuse of
Discretion Review
Because of the ambiguity inherent in the abuse of discretion standard and
confusion regarding the Court's application of that standard in Koon, it is
unclear how dramatically the Koon standard deviates from the tripartite
standard popular before Koon. This section suggests that it is possible to read
Koon to permit appellate courts to engage in fairly aggressive review of
sentencing judges' reasons for departure.
1. What Is an Abuse of Discretion?
One of the difficulties in understanding the application of standards of
review is that they are not self-enforcing; for example, a court can say that it is
applying a clear error standard, but who is to say when an error is "clear"?127
Even if one assumes that articulation of the standard constrains the appellate
court's analysis in some meaningful way, the nature and degree of that
constraint is not inherent in the language of the standard, but is realized only
through concrete application. The abuse of discretion standard seems
particularly prone to this uncertainty regarding its meaning. A number of
judges and scholars have noted that there really is no such thing as "the" abuse
of discretion standard; it is a phrase courts have used to describe a variety of
review processes of differing intensities. 128
126 487 U.S. 552 (1988). According to the Koon Court, "[c]onsiderations like these
[referring to the institutional advantages of district courts in deciding highly fact-specific
issues] persuaded us to adopt the abuse-of-discretion standard in" Cooter & Gell and Pierce.
116 S. Ct. at 2047.
In Cooter & Cell, the Court held that a district court's decision to impose a Rule 11
sanction was subject to abuse of discretion review. Pierce involved a similar issue: the proper
standard of review of a district court's determination that the government's litigation position
was "substantially justified," precluding an award of attorney's fees against the government
under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying
text (discussing Pierce and Cooter & Gell in more detail).
127 See, e.g., Steven Alan Childress, "C/early Erroneous". Judicial Review over District
Courts in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REv. 93, 95 (1986).
12 8 As Judge Henry J. Friendly explained:
There are a half dozen different definitions of "abuse of discretion," ranging from ones
that would require the appellate court to come close to finding that the trial court had
taken leave of its senses to others which differ from the definition of error by only the
slightest nuance, with numerous variations between the extremes.
1718 [Vol. 58:1697
DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW
Understanding what abuse of discretion means is further complicated by the
fact that it incorporates, in some sense, other standards of review. For example,
a district court abuses its discretion when it relies on a materially incorrect view
of the law in making what otherwise is characterized as a discretionary
choice.' 29 The Koon Court acknowledged this, going so far as to suggest that
review of such determinations about applicable law made within the abuse of
discretion standard is indistinguishable from de novo review.1 30 This creates a
potential for confusion regarding the appellate court's role, because de novo
analyses of essentially legal questions are subsumed within a broader analysis
that is labeled "abuse of discretion."131
The range of possible levels of deference implied by the label "abuse of
discretion" and the difficulty of disentangling the legal and factual
determinations that are constituent elements of a district court's discretionary
determination make it difficult to discern precisely how abuse of discretion
review of departures differs from the tripartite standard employed by the
Friendly, supra note 29, at 763; see also CnmDREss & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.01, at 4-13
to 4-16 (describing abuse of discretion standard as an "umbrella term" describing a "range of
appellate responses with varying degrees of deference handed down"); Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 635, 650
(1971) (describing "gradations of discretion, ranging from the toughest, most impenetrable
variety to types that are too flimsy to ward off any appellate scrutiny that looks askance at the
trial court's ruling").
129 See, e.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402 (discussing how abuse of discretion
review "would not preclude the appellate court's correction of a district court's legal errors").
130 The Koon Court stated:
The Government is quite correct that whether a factor is a permissible basis for
departure under any circumstances is a question of law, and the court of appeals need not
defer to the district court's resolution of the point. Little turns, however, on whether we
label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of
discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction. A
district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.
Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047 (citations omitted). The Court then went on to imply that this
concept, in the Guidelines departure context, is limited to whether a given factor ever can be a
permissible basis for departure. See id. at 2047.
However, even the Court's own application of the standard suggests that the issue is
much more complex than this analysis indicates. See infra Part I.C.2. See generally
CH Rass & DAvIS, supra note 52, § 4.01, at 4-5 (noting that abuse of discretion review can
send "an unclear message to future courts by wrapping the legal element involved in abuse of
discretion language").
13 1 See CHaLDRSS & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.01, at 4-4 to 4-6 (criticizing courts'
reflexive use of shorthand "abuse of discretion" language and urging courts to focus more
carefully on the precise nature of the question being reviewed).
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appellate courts prior to Koon.1 32 Moreover, an examination of the Koon
Court's application of the abuse of discretion standard suggests that the Court
itself seemed unsure exactly how deferential the standard is to be.
2. Review of the Koon Departures
Applying its newly-minted abuse of discretion standard, the Court
addressed in turn each of the district court's bases for departure, beginning with
the five-level victim misconduct departure. The Ninth Circuit had rejected this
departure, concluding that the possibility of victim misconduct is inherent in the
offense and therefore already adequately considered in the applicable
guidelines.1 33 Recognizing that the differing conclusions of the district court
and the Ninth Circuit arose from different conceptions of the "heartland" of
section 2H1.4, the applicable guideline, the Supreme Court held that the district
court's view was correct.134 Although the Court articulated the ultimate result
of its analysis in abuse of discretion terms, 135 the way the Court resolved the
disputed issue indicated that the issue tuned on the Court's interpretation of
132 Indeed, it is plausible to read Koon to impose a largely semantic change, simplifying
an awkward, unduly complex tripartite standard by collapsing it into a single review standard.
See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047-48 ("That a departure decision, in an occasional case, may call
for a legal determination does not mean, as a consequence, that parts of the review must be
labeled de novo while other parts are labeled abuse of discretion"). At least one appellate
court appears to have so interpreted Koon. See United States v. Dutchie, No. 95-4052, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 17524, at *10 (10th Cir. July 17, 1996) ("Subject to the overriding
requirement that we accord the district court's departure decision substantial deference, Koon
does not alter the three-tiered review process we apply in analyzing the propriety of a district
court's decision to depart upward.").
133 See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 116S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
134 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2048 (stating that the district court's analysis "showed a
correct understanding" in "interpreting [the] heartland" of the applicable guideline), 2049
(stating that the Ninth Circuit "misinterpreted both the district court's opinion and the
heartland of the applicable Guideline").
Key to this analysis was the Court's agreement with the district court that § 2H1.4
theoretically covered a wide variety of assault-based deprivations of civil rights, ranging from
vicious, unprovoked attacks to excessive force cases like Koon in which legitimate force
shaded into illegal behavior. See id. at 2050. In other words, there are aggravated assaults and
there are aggravated assaults. From this perspective, victim misconduct cannot be presumed
to be inherent in offenses governed by that guideline, and thus it may be a permissible ground
for departure in an appropriate case.
135 See id. at 2050 (stating that "the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
departing downward for King's misconduct in provoking the wrong").
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section 2H1.4, and as such was predominantly legal in nature. 136 As a result,
the victim misconduct departure does not provide a particularly useful test of
the scope of the discretion afforded the sentencing judge by the non-legal
components of the abuse of discretion standard of Koon. The Court's analysis
of the remaining departure factors provides a different manifestation of the
application of the abuse of discretion standard, and better highlights the Court's
ambivalence as to the intensity of review it permits.
In finding that the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion in relying
on the defendant's susceptibility to abuse in prison and the impact of successive
state and federal prosecutions, the Court was extraordinarily deferential to the
district court's analysis; indeed, its entire review process is an ipse dixit. With
respect to prison abuse, the Court cited the sentencing judge's finding that the
"widespread publicity and emotional outrage" associated with the videotaped
beating made this case unusual, and stated that "the District Court's conclusion
that this factor made the case unusual is just the sort of determination that must
be accorded deference by the appellate courts." 137
The Court's analysis of the successive prosecutions issue is even more
opaque. Its entire discussion of the issue consists of the following:
As for petitioners' successive prosecutions, it is true that consideration of
this factor could be incongruous with the dual responsibilities of citizenship in
our federal system in some instances. Successive state and federal prosecutions
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Nonetheless, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that a "federal conviction following a
state acquittal based on the same underlying conduct... significantly
burden[ed] the defendants." The state trial was lengthy, and the toll it took is
not beyond the cognizance of the District Court. 138
Nowhere does the Court consider whether these factors reflect appropriate
penal policy, or whether they are consistent with the structure and purposes of
136 This highlights how the abuse of discretion standard encompasses legal
determinations. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. This was not a situation in
which the dispute over the availability of departure tarned on such fact-intensive questions as
whether the victim's behavior amounted to provocation, or whether there was a sufficient
nexus between the victim's actions and the defendant's misconduct to conclude that the former
provoked the latter. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Although the Court was not
explicit in carving out for separate treatment the legal aspects of its analysis, appellate courts
implementing Koon must be careful to do so. See infra Part IV.B (urging appellate courts
applying Koon to engage in independent review of the legal components of the departure
decision). In this respect, the Court's adoption of a "unitary" abuse of discretion standard
obscures the nature of the departure review process.
137 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2053.
138 Id. (citations omitted).
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Guidelines sentencing, as the statutory provision authorizing departure clearly
requires. 139
The Court's reasoning on these departure grounds boils down to the
conclusion that the successive prosecutions and possible prison abuse faced by
the defendants make this case meaningfully atypical because the district court
said so. In contrast, the Court's majority engaged in a much more searching
review of the district judge's other articulated grounds for the three-level
downward departure, collateral employment consequences and low likelihood
of recidivism. First, the Court found that it was an abuse of discretion to
consider collateral employment consequences as a basis for departure. Quite
simply, the Court concluded that loss of employment is not uncommon for
public officials convicted of violating citizens' rights under color of law, so the
Commission must have taken this into account in formulating the applicableguideline. 140
The Court specifically emphasized that collateral employment consequences
were not categorically prohibited as a basis for departure, and criticized the
Ninth Circuit's opinion to the extent it can be read to suggest such a
prohibition. 141 Thus, by concluding that the district court abused its discretion
in considering this factor, the Court could be viewed as substituting its
judgment for that of the district court on the question whether this case falls
outside the heartland of the applicable guideline.142
Similarly, the Court held that the low likelihood of recidivism was an
inappropriate basis for departure. The Court reasoned that this factor already
was taken into account by the Guidelines through designation of the defendant's
criminal history category. 143
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (requiring district court to find an "aggravating or
mitigating" factor, not adequately considered by the Commission in formulating the
Guidelines, "that should result in a sentence different from that described" in the Guidelines
range) (emphasis added).
140 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2052.
141 See id.
142 This is not to suggest that the Court's decision on this point is wrong. This seems a
much more appropriate reading of the scope of the applicable guideline than that of the district
court. Nevertheless, this is a reasonably non-deferential approach to this particular issue,
especially in light of the fact that the Court's only argument for its conclusion that the
Commission adequately considered this factor is structural-that is, it viewed collateral
employment consequences as a sufficiently common factor that the Commission must have
considered it. If the district court may permissibly conclude that this case is meaningfully
atypical because of the successive prosecutions or the possibility of abuse in prison, why not
because of the collateral employment consequences?
143 See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2052. This factor is truly categorically excluded. As the
Commission explained:
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The difficulty in interpreting the real meaning of Koon's abuse of discretion
standard is-further exacerbated by the different methodologies employed by the
Justices purporting to apply the standard. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
concluded that the prison abuse and successive prosecution rationales were
invalid grounds for departure in this case. Justice Souter's dissent, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, 144 emphasized the "moral irrationality" of the prison abuse
departure, in that it was based specifically on the unusual brutality of the
crime.' 45 Justice Souter concluded, based on his analysis of the structure and
purposes of the relevant statutory and guidelines provisions, that neither
Congress nor the Guidelines would have authorized downward departure for
the most morally culpable offenders. 146 Justice Souter went out of his way to
emphasize that he was not categorically rejecting either of these grounds of
departure.' 47 His dissent represents a rejection of the sentencing judge's
particularized determination that successive prosecution and prison abuse were
grounds not adequately considered by the Commission that warrant a departure
sentence.
The approaches of the dissenting Justices thus suggest a much less
The lower limit of the range for Criminal History Category I is set for a first offender
with the lowest risk of recidivism. Therefore, a departure below the lower limit of the
guideline range for Criminal History Category I on the basis of adequacy of criminal
history cannot be appropriate.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEL'ES MANuAL § 4A1.3 (1997).
144 Justice Breyer, while not formally joining Justice Souter's dissent, indicated
agreement with his reasoning. See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2056 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("I join the Court's opinion with the exception of Part IV-B-3 [dealing
with successive prosecutions and susceptibility to abuse in prison]. I agree with Justice
Souter's conclusion in respect to that section."). Justice Breyer added his own partial dissent
which employed an approach methodologically similar to Justice Souter's, but added that the
successive prosecution and prison abuse grounds had been adequately considered and rejected
by the Commission. See id.
145 Id. at 2054-55 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146 See id. at 2055. Justice Souter's approach appears to emphasize a legal component to
the sentencing judge's determination regarding whether a particular factor makes a case
meaningflly atypical for departure purposes that the majority seems not to recognize. Justice
Souter used similar reasoning in rejecting the successive prosecutions rationale as
"normatively irrational[ ]" in that it effectively rewards defendants in the federal prosecution
for the injustice produced by the failure of the state system adequately to prosecute them. Id.
at 2056.
147 See id. at 2055 n.2 (suggesting the possibility for prison abuse departure based on
unusual physical appearance), 2056 (stating that "[t]his is not, of course, to say that a
succession of state and federal prosecutions may never justify a downward departure").
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deferential conception of the abuse of discretion standard than some of the
Court's language suggests. This sends mixed signals to the appellate courts
about the intensity of review required by Koon.
If the abuse of discretion standard adopted in Koon permits appellate courts
to treat the validity of sentencing judges' articulated grounds for departure as
legal determinations wrapped inside a discretionary decision, then Koon does
not substantially change the departure review process. It merely obscures the
nature of that process, introducing unnecessary confusion. Assuming, however,
that the Court intended appellate courts to defer to sentencing judges'
conclusions about the existence of proper grounds for departure, Koon is
inconsistent with the Guidelines scheme and the Court's own standard of review
jurisprudence.
II. KooNs's CHOICE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION REvIEw Is UNJUSTIFIED
Some of Koon's analysis suggests that the Court intended the abuse of
discretion standard to change materially the level of deference appellate courts
owe sentencing judges' grounds for departure. Much of this analysis vastly
underestimates the extent to which the Guidelines system Congress put into
place was designed to restrict the traditional discretion of individual sentencing
judges. Consequently, it erroneously devalues the proper institutional role of
appellate review of departures within that system.
A. Nothing in the SRA Compels Abuse of Discretion Review
The Koon Court viewed the Guidelines system as minimally disruptive of
the individual sentencing judge's traditional prerogatives; according to Koon,
sentencing judges retain substantial latitude to depart, and appellate review of
these departures is limited and deferential. 148 This view was based largely on
the Court's interpretation of the language and legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742, along with the interpretive gloss of prior case law.' 49 However, the
Court's sources better support an alternative vision which emphasizes the
Guidelines system as an effort to impose a largely centralized sentencing law,
including an evolving body of guiding legal principles to constrain and channel
the discretion of individual sentencing judges. Meaningful appellate review of
departures constitutes a central aspect of this system, and to the extent Koon
weakens such review, it is fundamentally inconsistent with the system Congress
put into place.
148 See sUpra Part II.B.
149 See id.
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1. The "Due Deference" Language
The Court viewed as significant Congress's admonition to the courts of
appeals in section 3742(e) to accord "due deference" to a district court's
application of the Guidelines to the facts. 150 While this language appears to be
inconsistent with plenary review, it does not compel adoption of abuse of
discretion review of departures. The "due deference" language is inherently
malleable; nothing in section 3742 indicates exactly how much deference is due
any given application of the Guidelines to the facts. 151 Congress could explicitly
have required abuse of discretion review, or review for clear error, but it chose
more flexible language instead. 152 Because the plain meaning of the due
deference language as applied to the sentencing judge's determination of her
departure authority is unclear, it is appropriate to seek additional guidance as to
the meaning of that language in its legislative history. 153
150 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
151 It is significant that the application of the Guidelines to facts occurs in a variety of
contexts other than determining whether there are permissible grounds to depart. Thus, the
"due deference" language applies to a wide variety of Guidelines determinations, ranging
from the selection of the appropriate base offense guideline from several possibilities, see
United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d 943, 949 (2d Cir.) (holding that obstruction of justice
guideline, rather than misprision guideline, is most analogous guideline for criminal contempt
conviction), modified, 96 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996), to the applicability of specific offense
characteristics such as whether the defendant possessed a weapon in connection with a drug
trafficking offense, see U.S. SENTENN rG GuiDEL qEs MANuAL § 2D1.l(b)(1) (1997), to the
applicability of Chapter Three adjustments, such as whether the defendant was a leader or
organizer of criminal activity, see id. § 3B1.1, or clearly demonstrated acceptance of
responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1. Some of these determinations resemble findings of pure
historical fact, while others more closely resemble conclusions of law.
152 Congress certainly knew how to articulate a standard of review in the appropriate
terms of art. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1994) (providing for review -of district court's
findings of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard). Had it intended appellate courts to
use abuse of discretion review, it could have said so. Q. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 580-81 (1981) (inferring from Congress's failure to include limiting language that
definition of RICO enterprise is broad enough to include purely criminal associations).
153 Reliance on legislative history as a tool of statutory construction has, over the past
two decades, become somewhat controversial, spawning a vast literature critical of (at least
some forms of) its use. See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSmRA L. REv. 1125, 1131-33 (1983) (arguing that floor debate is
too unreliable to be useful in statutory construction); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 548 (1983) (using public choice theory to demonstrate
that judges' reliance on legislative history amounts to nothing more than "wild guesses");
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371,
375-76 (articulating formalist "democratic theory" critique of use of legislative history).
Justice Antonin Scalia is probably the most prominent critic of the use of legislative history as
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The legislative history surrounding the adoption of the "due deference"
language is inconsistent with the unitary abuse of discretion standard adopted by
the Court in Koon. Representative John Conyers, then-Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, read into the Congressional Record a section-by-section
analysis, which stated with regard to section 3742:
This [due deference] standard is intended to give the court of appeals flexibility
in reviewing an application of a guideline standard that involves some
subjectivity. The deference due a district court's determination will depend
upon the relationship of the facts found to the guidelines standard being
applied. If the particular determination involved closely resembles a finding of
fact, the court of appeals would apply a clearly erroneous test. As the
determination approaches a purely legal determination, however, the court of
appeals would review the determination more closely.154
This was the only discussion of the relevant language on either the House or the
Senate floor.
The section-by-section analysis used the Guidelines' Chapter Three
"vulnerable victim" adjustment 55 as an example of the operation of due
deference review. It stated:
Making the subjective determination required by section 3Al (whether the
victim was "unusually vulnerable"), unlike resolving purely factual questions,
is not uniquely within the district court's expertise. The clearly erroneous
standard therefore, would be inappropriate.
On the other hand, because a determination under section 3A1.1 of the
sentencing guidelines depends heavily on the unique factual patterns of the
an interpretive tool, anthoring a number of concurring or dissenting opinions criticizing the
Court for its use of legislative history. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing the Court for relying on legislative history in light of clarity of statutory language).
Justice Scalia's critique has influenced the Court, which has become less sanguine about
extensive reliance on legislative history since Scalia joined the Court. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 656-66 (1990). Nevertheless,
the Court has not abandoned reliance on legislative history, particularly when there is
ambiguity in the statutory text. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 454-56
(1997) (citing contemporaneous House Report to interpret ambiguous language).
154 134 CONG. REc. 33,303 (1988) (emphasis added).
155 U.S. STENCiNG Gumumss MANUAL § 3Al.l(b) (1997) (permitting a two-level
upward adjustment "[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense
was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was
otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct").
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case, that determination cannot be considered simply a legal question. 156
This analysis is not a model of clarity. It could be read to create a sliding scale
of review intensity, ranging from deferential clear error review for factual
determinations to de novo review for questions of law, with intermediate levels
of review for mixed questions. 157 More likely, it is nothing more than a
restatement of the prevailing approach to mixed questions of fact and law, a
reminder to the appellate courts that not all Guidelines determinations are
predominantly legal and thus subject to plenary review. 158
In any event, two things are apparent. First, whatever Congress meant,
characterizing section 3742 as creating an abuse of discretion standard for
appellate review of any Guidelines determination seems an odd choice, given
the prevailing view that abuse of discretion is the most deferential of the
commonly applied standards of review. 159 Second, the scope and flexibility of
the due deference language indicates that Congress may well have contemplated
that different types of Guidelines determinations would be accorded different
156 134 CONG. REc. 33,303 (1988).
157 Semi de novo review perhaps? Relatively close review? It is difficult to determine
exactly what appellate role Congress contemplated. The suggestion that a court would review
"more closely" determinations that approach "purely legal" status arguably is consistent with
some sort of intermediate review, however one would label it.
158 Indeed, this is the view of then-Chairman of the Sentencing Commission William
Wilkins, who explained:
The level of deference due a sentencing judge's application of the guidelines to the
facts thus depends on the circumstances of the case. If the issue turns primarily on a
factual determination, an appellate court should apply the "clearly erroneous standard."
If a case turns primarily on the legal interpretation of a guidelines term or on which of
several offense conduct guidelines most appropriately applies to facts as found, the
standard moves to one akin to de novo review. This "due deference" standard is, then,
the standard courts long have employed when reviewing mixed questions of fact and
law. On mixed questions, courts have not defined any bright-line standard of review.
Rather, the standard of review applied varies with the "mix" of the mixed question.
William W. Wflkim, Jr., Sentencing Reform and Appellate Review, 46 WAsH. & LE L.
REv. 429, 434-35 (1989).
159 See supra note 49. But see Omelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 n.3
(1996) (characterizing "clear error" as a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and suggesting that "abuse of discretion" is a "preferable term" for
the deferential review some lower courts applied to determinations of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion). The Court's use of the term "abuse of discretion" in this context may
suggest that the Court does not interpret that standard to be as deferential as some courts and
commentators have previously suggested.
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degrees of deference on appeal. 160 Neither section 3742 nor any relevant
legislative history tell us how departure review should be treated. This is a
determination left to the courts, to be made based on the institutional
considerations addressed in subpart III.B of this Article.
2. The Senate Report
The Koon Court attempted to bolster its interpretation of the "due
deference" language by quoting the following language from the 1983 Senate
Report: "The sentencing provisions of this reported bill are designed to
preserve the concept that the discretion of a sentencing judge has a proper place
in sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate
court." 161 This language is too general to provide meaningful guidance on the
standard of review issue. It in no way implies an intent to have departures
reviewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The Senate Report is
silent on this issue. Moreover, the quoted language sheds no light on the
meaning of the "due deference" language added by Congress five years later.
To be fair, the Court was using this Senate Report language not to
demonstrate conclusively Congress's intent to impose a deferential standard of
appellate review of departures, but merely to support the more general
proposition that Congress intended to preserve substantial discretion for
sentencing judges. 162 This general principle then informs the Court's analysis of
the more specific question. However, even this limited use of the Senate Report
cannot withstand scrutiny. The Court's selective quotation from the Senate
Report leaves out crucial language which emphasizes the importance of strong
appellate review in promoting the creation of a rational, principled sentencing
scheme as a means to achieve a reduction in unwarranted sentencing disparity
(which was, after all, the central purpose of the Guidelines). 163
The paragraph immediately following the language quoted by the Court
goes on to say:
At the same time, they [the sentencing provisions of the reported bill] are
intended to afford enough guidance and control of the exercise of that
discretion to promote fairness and rationality, and to reduce unwarranted
disparity, in sentencing. Section 3742 accommodates all of these considerations
by making appellate review of sentences available equally to the defendant and
the government, and by confining it to cases in which the sentences are illegal,
160 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
161 S. REp. No. 98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333.
162 See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996).
163 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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are imposed as the result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines, or are outside the range specified in the guidelines and
unreasonable.164
This language emphasizes the importance of the appellate role in shaping
Guidelines sentencing. At the same time, it reflects Congress's intent to
preserve the sentencing judge's discretion and to limit the appellate role, not by
imposing a weak standard of review of departure grounds, but by permitting
appellate intervention in sentencing determinations only in limited situations.
Thus, the essential residual discretion of the sentencing judge is preserved
principally by insulating from appellate review two determinations: the judge's
choice of a sentence from within the Guidelines sentencing range, 165 and the
judge's discretionary decision not to depart from the Guidelines sentencing
range. 166 In other words, Congress attempted to minimize appellate usurpation
of appropriate district court authority through limitations on the scope of
review, not by limitations on the intensity of review.
3. Prior Case Law
The Court's use of Williams v. United States167 in support of its theory of
limited, deferential departure review is similarly flawed. The Court quoted the
following language from Williams:
Although the [Sentencing Reform] Act established a limited appellate review of
sentencing decisions, it did not alter the court of appeals' traditional deference
to a district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion... . The development
of the guideline sentencing regime has not changed our view that, except to the
extent specifically directed by statute, "it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness
164 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150 (emphasis added).
165 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Bowman, supra note 9, at 713
(characterizing as "not a trivial matter" the sentencing judge's discretion to choose the point
within the range). As Bowman concludes:
In effect, the Guidelines say that seventy-five percent of each criminal sentence will be
determined by the severity of the current offense and the seriousness of the defendant's
prior criminal history, and twenty-five percent of the sentence will rest on the sentencing
judge's virtually unreviewable assessment of individualized factors.
Id.
166 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
167 503 U.S. 193 (1992).
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of a particular sentence. "168
Taken out of context, this language appears to support the Court's limited
departure review theme.
However, the following language, deleted from the above quotation by the
use of ellipses, again highlights the distinction between scope and intensity of
review that eluded the Court in Koon: "The selection of the appropriate
sentence from within the guideline range, as well as the decision to depart from
the range in certain circumstances, are decisions that are left solely to the
sentencing court.' 1 69 The cited language from Williams does no more than
recognize the limitations on the scope of appellate review Congress put into
place: nothing in that case suggests a need for deferential review of departures.
Indeed, precisely the opposite is the case. By recognizing that departures based
on invalid grounds are an incorrect application of the Guidelines, 170 the Court
acknowledged the essentially "legal" nature of the district court's determination
regarding whether departure is permissible in a given case, indicating that
deferential review is not appropriate. 171
In addition, the "substitute its judgment" language in Williams was
designed to refute the dissenters' contention that the appellate court could
simply affirm the partially valid departure on the basis of its own independent
assessment that the departure sentence was reasonable.172 It is in this sense,
rather than with respect to the standard of review, that Wiliams emphasized the
sentencing judge's prerogative to determine the departure sentence in light of
permissible departure factors.' 73 This language in no way implies a need for
deferential review of the validity of departure factors, although it is consistent
with deference as to direction and degree of a valid departure.' 74
In short, Koon failed to make a persuasive case that either the SRA's text
and legislative history, or Williams's gloss on those sources, warrants a
conclusion that departures should be reviewed using a deferential abuse of
168 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046 (1996) (quoting Williams, 503 U.S. at
205).
169 Wrlliams, 503 U.S. at 205 (citing U.S. SENMq=CING GUIDE NES MANUAL § 5K2.0
(1991)) (emphasis added); see also notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
171 See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
172 Williams, 503 U.S. at 205.
173 See id. (holding that remand was required because "it is the prerogative of the
district court, not the court of appeals, to determine, in the first instance, the sentence that
should be imposed in light of certain factors properly considered under the Guidelines").
174 This is, of course, the approach adopted by the courts of appeals prior to Koon. See
supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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discretion standard. Although Congress wanted to preserve some discretion for
sentencing judges, all indications are that it did so by insulating from appellate
review the sentencing judge's selection of the point within the Guidelines
sentencing range, as well as the sentencing judge's discretionary decision not to
depart. The intensity of review of the permissibility of departure is a question
answerable only by analysis of the institutional roles of departure and appellate
review in the Guidelines system.
B. Considerations of "Institutional Advantage" Favor Strong Departure
Review
The Koon Court's analysis also relied heavily on its perception of the
"institutional advantages" district courts possess in determining whether a case
is sufficiently unusual to be eligible for departure. This perception was driven
by two considerations: first, the sentencing judge's departure decision involves
"the consideration of unique factors that are 'little susceptible... of useful
generalization'"; 175 and second, the sentencing judge is in a better position than
are appellate judges to evaluate whether a case is meaningfully atypical because
of the sentencing judge's daily proximity to the facts of Guidelines cases. 176
The Court's reasoning is flawed on both counts. The departure determination
was not designed to be as ad hoc as the Court suggests. The operative
principles announced in appellate departure cases can provide meaningful
guidance to sentencing judges in future cases. Indeed, developing principled
guidance of this sort is a central purpose of Guidelines sentencing. Moreover, it
is precisely the perspective provided by the appellate courts' distance from
individual cases that enables them to provide principled guidance and promote
greater consistency among individual sentencing judges.
1. Determining Appellate Review Standards from Institutional
Considerations: Narrow Facts vs. Law Declaration
The proper standard of appellate review of a particular type of trial court
determination sometimes is determined by "explicit statutory command" or by
a "long history of appellate practice.'1 77 More often, however, the courts must
determine standards of review in the absence of such direction. In performing
175 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)).
176 See id. (pointing out that because the vast majority of Guidelines cases are never
appealed, district judges are in a better position to compare the facts before them with those of
other Guidelines cases).
177 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
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this task, the Supreme Court has eschewed a comprehensive analytical
framework in favor of a functional analysis which focuses on the relative
institutional strengths and weaknesses of district and appellate courts in light of
the issues presented. 178 Rather than focusing exclusively on characterizing the
issue as one of law, fact, or trial court discretion, the Court weighs the various
practical considerations counseling for and against deferential review.
This functional analysis necessarily varies due to its case-by-case nature,
but has tended to turn largely on whether the issue before the appellate court is
one which is generalizable in the sense that principles announced in appellate
decisions meaningfully can guide future decisions in analogous settings. The
absence of "generalizability" has been a major factor favoring deferential
appellate review. As Professor Maurice Rosenberg stated:
One of the "good" reasons for conferring discretion on the trial judge is the
sheer impracticability of formulating a rule of decision for the matter in issue.
Many questions that arise in litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule
because they involve multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly
resist [useful] generalization-at least, for the time being.' 79
Thus, where the question on appeal depends heavily on such factors as witness
demeanor or credibility, 180 a party's state of mind, 181 or other matters not well
178 See id. at 559-60 (stating that standards of review turn "on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question") (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985)). Although the Court adopted this functional analysis in determining the appropriate
treatment of a mixed question of law and fact, it explained that the same considerations are
applicable in choosing between de novo review and a more deferential abuse of discretion
standard. See id. at 557-58.
179 Rosenberg, supra note 128, at 662. He further explains:
In the dialogue between the appellate judges and the trial judge, the former often
seem to be saying: "You were there. We do not think we would have done what
you did, but we were not present and we may be unaware of significant matters, for
the record does not adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial. Therefore,
we defer to you."
Id. at 663.
180 See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (applying deferential review
standard to juror impartiality determinations because they tm largely on determinations of
demeanor and credibility).
181 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90 (1982) (applying
clearly erroneous standard to review findings regarding the existence of defendant's
discriminatory intent under Title VII).
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represented on the record, 182 the Court has urged deferential review. In
contrast, where independent appellate review would promote clarification of
legal principles, the Court has held deference to be inappropriate.' 83
Application of these principles and their implications for Koon may best be
understood through a more detailed comparison and contrast of recent Supreme
Court cases addressing standards of appellate review: Pierce v. Underwood184
and Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,185 in which the Court determined
deferential review was appropriate, and Ornelas v. United States186 and
Thompson v. Keohane,1s7 in which the Court held that independent review was
required.
In Pierce, the Court held that the trial court's decision to award attorney's
fees against the United States under the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA") 88 should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Several key principles
animated this conclusion. First, the Court acknowledged that determining
whether the government's litigation position was substantially justified for
EAJA attorney's fees award purposes is, broadly categorized, an issue of
litigation supervision. Such issues traditionally have been subject to deferential
review. 189
Second, Pierce emphasized that the district court was better positioned to
determine whether the government's litigation posture was substantially justified
182 See, e.g., Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560 (taking into account district court insights into
litigation practices not apparent in the record as a factor favoring abuse of discretion review).
183 See infra notes 191-209 and accompanying text.
184 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
185 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
186 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
187 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
188 The pertinent portions of the EAJA require courts to award attorney's fees to
litigants prevailing against the United States in civil litigation unless there is a finding that the
government's litigation position is "substantially justified." The relevant language provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses .... incurred by that party in
any civil action. . . ,brought by or against the United States .... unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
189 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558 n. 1 ("It is especially common for issues involving what
can broadly be labeled as 'supervision of litigation,' which is the sort of issue presented here,
to be given abuse-of-discretion review."). See generally supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text (discussing abuse of discretion review in context of litigation supervision).
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because of pre-trial exposure to evidence not necessarily reflected in the
record. 190 The Court in Pierce concluded that the district judge's on-the-scene
presence created a comparative advantage in evaluating whether the
government's losing position was substantially justified.
In addition, the Pierce Court articulated the concern that EAJA attorney's
fees determinations are "multifarious and novel" questions, not susceptible of
useful generalization. This was the case due to the flexibility of the statutory
"substantially justified" standard itself, which the Court equated with a test of
"reasonable basis in both law and fact." 191 In other words, the EAJA attorney's
fees determinations addressed in Pierce were not based on whether the
government's litigation position satisfied a substantive statutory standard (that
is, whether the government's position was "correct"), but on whether the
government's position was "close enough." Questions of this sort do not lend
themselves to precedent-based analysis. Finally, Pierce expressed the concern
that de novo review of EAJA attorney's fees determinations would encourage
satellite litigation, involving a pseudo-redetermination of the merits by the
appellate court. 192
The Court cited similar considerations in holding in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp. 193 that Rule 11 sanctions194 should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. The Rule 11 review question, like the EAJA question, is
categorically one of litigation management, traditionally reviewed deferentially.
The underlying legal standard was not one of "correctness," but one of
reasonableness, which requires a fact-specific, comprehensive record
190 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560 ("by reason of settlement conferences and other pretrial
activities, the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record, into such matters as
whether particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon, or whether critical facts could
easily have been verified by the Government.").
Alternatively, the Court noted that even where the appellate court could gain access to all
the relevant record evidence, de novo review would require it "to undertake the
unaccustomed task of reviewing the entire record... to determine whether urging of the
opposite merits determination was substantially justified." Id. In contrast, a full record review
is not required to determine whether a particular departure factor is valid.
191 Id. at 565, 566 n.2; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-1434, at 22 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5011 (stating that "[tihe test of whether the Government
position is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness in law and fact").
192 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563 ("In addition to furthering the goals we have described,
[abuse of discretion review] will implement our view that a 'request for attorney's fees should
not result in a second major litigation.'") (citation omitted).
193 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
194 See FaD. R. Crv. P. 11(c) (authorizing sanctions for filing of pleadings not well-
grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or its good faith extension, based on the filing
attorney's reasonable inquiry).
1734 [V/ol. 58:1697
DISCRETIONAND THE RULE OFLAW
review.' 95 The nature of this review, which the Court compared to
determinations of negligence, favors the district court because of its proximity
to the facts. 196 Finally, the Court expressed some concern that de novo review
of Rule 11 sanctions would spur inefficient satellite litigation. 97
Ornelas and Thompson provide an interesting contrast. In Ornelas v.
United States, 198 decided just two weeks before Koon, the Court held that de
novo review is applicable to district court findings regarding both the existence
of reasonable suspicion to stop and question citizens, and the existence of
probable cause to make a warrantless search. 199 Ornelas arose from petitioners'
attempts to suppress evidence of cocaine found in their car as a result of an
investigatory stop which blossomed into a warrantless search of the car.2°° The
district court found that the investigatory stop was adequately supported by
reasonable suspicion, 201 and that the warrantless search was adequately
supported by probable cause. 202 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable &cuse under a deferential "clear error" standard.203 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reasonable suspicion determination,
195 See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 401-02 ("For example, to determine whether an
attorney's prefiling inquiry was reasonable, a court must consider all the circumstances of a
case."). The Court further noted that the flexible reasonableness standard associated with
application of Rule 11 was not well-suited to precedent-creating nile articulation. See id. at
405 ("An appellate court's review of whether a legal position was reasonable or plausible
enough under the circumstances [to avoid Rule 11 sanctions] is unlikely to establish clear
guidelines for lower courts; nor will it clarify the underlying principles of law.").
196 See i&. at 402 ("Familiar with the issues and litigants, the district court is better
situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent
legal standard mandated by Rule 11.").
197 See id. at 404 ("Such deference will streamline the litigation process by freeing
appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already
weighed and considered by the district court; it will also discourage litigants from pursuing
marginal appeals, thus reducing the amount of satellite litigation.").
198 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
199 See id. at 1659.
200 Seei. at 1660.
201 See id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (investigatory stop by
police is permissible if supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that the person stopped is
involved in criminal activity).
202 See Ornekas, 116 S. Ct. at 1659; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
569-70 (1991) (stating that warrantless search of an automobile is permissible if based on
probable cause).
203 United States v. Onelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1994), vacated sub
nom., Omelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
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and remanded for further factual findings on the probable cause
determination. 204 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the circuits as to the standard of review applied to reasonable suspicion
and probable cause determinations. 20 5
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that reasonable
suspicion and probable cause determinations should be reviewed de novo. 20 6
Justice Rehnquist conceded that both reasonable suspicion and probable cause
are fluid, commonsense concepts that are "not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 20 7 He further conceded that these concepts
derive their content from the particular facts unique to individual cases.208 Yet
the Court concluded in Ome/as that the fact-intensive reasonable suspicion and
probable cause inquiries nevertheless should be subjected to de novo review.
The central theme of the Court's analysis was that despite the fact-intensive
nature of probable cause and reasonable suspicion questions, plenary appellate
review aids in the development of the law in those areas. That is, the Court
recognized that the elaboration of generally applicable constitutional norms
could occur through the consideration of closely related fact situations.209
In addition to the ability to generalize from fact specific applications of
Fourth Amendment principles, the Onelas Court emphasized the importance of
efforts to promote law development through such generalization. This law
development furthers two important rule of law interests: consistency and
fairness in application, 210 and stabilization and promotion of certainty in the
204 See id. at 719-22.
205 See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661. The Court noted that, in contrast to the deferential
approach of the Seventh Circuit, the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had engaged in de
novo review of lower court conclusions regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. See id. at 1661 n.4.
206 See id. at 1659.
2 07 Id. at 1661 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
208 See id.
20 9 The Court emphasized that "even where one case may not squarely control another
one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the
subject." Id. at 1663. The Court cited several examples in which its earlier decisions
involving probable cause or reasonable suspicion determinations served as guiding precedent
for later cases. Id. at 1662 (noting that, among other examples, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) influenced Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) influenced United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); and
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) influenced California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991)).
2 10 See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662 (highlighting the necessity of treating similar fact
patterns similarly).
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law.211
In contrast to these advantages conferred by de novo review, the Court
expressed the concern that exceedingly deferential review would permit the
effective scope of the Fourth Amendment to turn on the idiosyncratic
determinations of individual judges, creating the risk of varying results that
"would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law." 212 It also
noted that deferential review would undermine the appellate courts' crucial
function of law declaration-the announcement and clarification of legal
principles. 213
The Court's reasoning in Thompson v. Keohane214 was quite similar. In
that case, the Court held that the presumption of correctness afforded state court
factual determinations in federal habeas corpus proceedings215 does not extend
to conclusions regarding whether the defendant was "in custody" for
Miranda216 purposes.217 Rather, the Court concluded that the "in custody"
determination is a mixed question of law and fact requiring independent (non-
deferential) review. 218 As the Court explained,
2 11 See id. (explaining that de novo review will help unify precedent and aid law
enforcement officials in understanding what the law requires).
212 Id.
213 See id. ("Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to
maintain control of, and to clarify the legal principles.").
214 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
2 15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
2 16 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (requiring suppression of
confession obtained from custodial interrogation in the absence of warnings designed to
inform the suspect of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
2 17 See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 462.
218 See id. at 465. The procedural posture of Thompson was different from that in
Ornelas. Because Thompson involved a collateral attack under the habeas corpus provisions,
rather than a direct appeal, Thompson technically did not involve a choice between a clearly
erroneous standard and a de novo standard, but rather a choice between independent review
of the state court's "in custody" determination and affording that determination the
presumption of correctness required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) with respect to fact
determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). However, many appellate courts have
considered the independent review/presumption of correctness determination to be
functionally equivalent to the de novo/clear error determination made in direct appeal cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1032 (1996) (concluding that de novo review of determination of voluntariness of
confession is compelled by Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), a § 2254 independent
review case); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Romero, 897 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). The Supreme Court itself does not
differentiate between independent review in habeas cases and de novo review in direct appeal
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Classifying "in custody" as a determination qualifying for independent review
should serve legitimate law enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to
insure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our decisions bear
out, the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide
police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law. 219
Thus, in Thompson, as in Ornelas, the Court emphasized the necessity of
independent appellate review to further case-by-case development of important
legal principles.
In short, one canvassing recent Supreme Court decisions addressing
standards of appellate review might view Pierce and Cooter & Gell as model
cases for deferential review and Ornelas and Thompson as the models for non-
deferential review. By relying on Pierce and Cooter & Cell, and completely
ignoring Ornelas and Thompson, the Koon Court chose the wrong model. As
the next section demonstrates, appellate departure case law both is capable of
providing guidance to district courts and is necessary to promote the central
purposes of the Guidelines. Thus, deferential abuse of discretion review of the
permissibility of departure is inadvisable.
2. Appellate Review and the Development of
Departure Jurisprudence
a. Generalizability-The Possibility of Principled Departure Analysis
A key to the Koon Court's analysis was its conclusion that because
departure determinations are not susceptible of useful generalization, de novo
review "is unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts." 220 This
characterization is demonstrably inaccurate. Pre-Koon Guidelines departure
case law is replete with examples of the kind of appellate-driven jurisprudential
development that Koon suggests is not possible. Take, for example, the
treatment of defendant's restitution to the victim as a potential basis for
downward departure. 221 The Guidelines are silent on the appropriateness of
cases. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988) (citing a § 2254 case,
Miller, as authority in direct appeal context).
219 Thompson, 116S. Ct. at 467.
220 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996) (citation omitted).
221 One could point to any number of other issues to demonstrate the role of appellate
review in developing departure jurisprudence. I chose the restitution case law because it is
commonly litigated, and the case law is well-developed.
1738 [Vol. 58:1697
DISCRETIONAND THE RULE OF LAW
departing on the basis of restitution as such.222 However, many courts have
looked to the language and structure of the Guidelines as a whole, and have
concluded that the Commission included restitution as a factor courts should
consider in deciding whether to grant a downward offense-level adjustment for
the defendant's acceptance of responsibility.223 Based on this analysis, most
courts treat restitution as a factor that already has been taken into account by the
Guidelines, and thus one that should not, in the ordinary case, be a basis for
departure.224 It can, however, be taken into account where it is present to a
degree making the case atypical or unusual. 22 5
These conclusions, which are based on interpretations of the language and
purposes of relevant guidelines provisions, have been cited as having
precedential value in later cases.226 Even the Koon Court would acknowledge
that this determination, which may be characterized as going to whether a
sentencing judge may ever consider restitution in departing from the
Guidelines, is a conclusion of law, providing controlling authority to district
courts.227 It is a more difficult question whether the more specific
determination-deciding if the defendant's restitution in a particular case
qualifies as extraordinary-similarly has precedential value. The answer,
however, is the same. As in Ornelas, the consideration of related fact situations
on a case-by-case basis permits the gradual accretion of generally operative
principles that provide meaningful guidance to lower courts.
For example, the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hairston228 demonstrates that a number of
relevant guiding principles have evolved through development of the restitution-
based departure case law. The court noted that the amount of restitution as a
percentage of the victim's loss has been deemed relevant to the departure
222 See, e.g., United States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102, 107 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 956 (1997).
223 See U.S. SENTENCiNG GUiDEUmEs MANuAL § 3E.1 application note 1 (1997)
(enumerating factors judge should consider in granting acceptance of responsibility
adjustment, including "voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt").
224 See, e.g., United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Ordinarily,
payment of restitution is not an appropriate basis for downward departure under Section
5K2.0 because it is adequately taken into account by Guidelines Section 3E1.1 .... ").
225 See, e.g., United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161, 163-464 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 1990).
226 See, e.g., Hairston, 96 F.3d at 107-08.
227 See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996) ("The Government is quite
correct that whether a factor is a permissible basis for departure under any circumstances is a
question of law.. ").
228 96 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 956 (1997).
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inquiry, with some courts rejecting even full restitution as a basis for
departure. 229 It also noted the importance of the timing of the restitution230 and
the source of the funds.231 Relying on these principles extracted from existing
case law, the court concluded that the defendant's restitution in the amount of
slightly less than one-half the victim's loss, made after her indictment, using
money raised for her by friends and members of her church, was not
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant downward departure, and that the
sentencing judge had abused his discretion in concluding otherwise. 232
In short, a sentencing judge faced with deciding whether a particular
defendant's act of restitution is sufficiently atypical to authorize a departure is
not without guidance. Although the judge's determination depends on the
unique facts and circumstances of the case, it is meaningfully channeled by the
principles announced in earlier cases involving broadly analogous facts. The
Koon Court was wrong to characterize the district court's determinations about
permissibility of departure as resistant to guidance from independent appellate
review. The elaboration of generally applicable legal principles through
appellate consideration of closely related fact situations occurs here much the
same way as it does in the Fourth Amendment and Miranda Fifth Amendment
contexts, recognized by the Court in Ornelas and Thompson, respectively. 233
b. Rule of Law Interests-The Importance of Principled Departure
Analysis and the Role of Appellate Review in Shaping that Analysis
In addition to evaluating amenability to rules or governing principles, the
Court's standards of review jurisprudence has emphasized the extent to which
229 See id. at 108 (comparing, inter alia, United States v. Arjoon, 964 F.2d 167, 171
(2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting departure based on restitution of 50% of loss amount) and United
States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 322-24 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting departure based on
restitution of 90% of loss amount) with United States v. Davis, 797 F. Supp. 672, 677 (N.D.
Ind. 1992) (imposing departure based on restitution in excess of some estimates of loss) and
United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming departure where
restitution was $34,000 in excess of loss)).
230 See Hairston, 96 F.3d at 109 (comparing Garlich, 951 F.2d at 162-63 (finding
significance in defendant's offer to make restitution prior to learning of FBI investigation)
with United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1993) (questioning whether
restitution was truly "voluntary," given defendant's motive to settle civil lawsuit) and United
States v. Bennett, 60 F.3d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1995) (same)).
231 See Hairston, 96 F.3d at 109 (citing United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336, 1340-
41 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that restitution made with borrowed money did not justify
departure)).
232 See id.
233 See supra notes 198-209, 219 and accompanying text.
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non-deferential review will serve important practical interests. For example,
where constitutional principles are at stake, the Court has been unwilling to
countenance deferential review.234 On the other hand, the absence of
"substantial consequences" associated with a particular type of lower court
determination has worked in favor of deferential review.2 35 Given what is at
stake in determining the permissibility of a departure from the presumptive
Guidelines sentence, the Court's approach suggests that such determinations
warrant independent appellate review.
First, the nature and purposes of the Guidelines generally, and the
departure provisions specifically, highlight the importance of promoting the
development of guiding principles through appellate review. The sentencing
reform movement which spurred Congress's adoption of the SRA was a
reaction to the perception that the pre-Guidelines discretionary sentencing
regime was, in some important sense, lawless. 236 The political and academic
supporters of sentencing reform articulated a contrasting vision of a "rational"
sentencing scheme, the key features of which were binding guidelines and
appellate review. These two mechanisms were designed specifically to permit
the creation of a body of legal sentencing principles, a jurisprudence of
sentencing, that would constrain judicial decisionmaking. 237 As Judge Marvin
Frankel explained:
234 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1985) (holding that
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) does not apply to findings of actual malice in
defamation cases governed by New York Times v. Sullivan Co., 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). See
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985)
(discussing the role of appellate review of mixed questions of law and fact in the case-by-case
development of constitutional principles).
The concern for the impact of appellate review on constitutional development underlying
the constitutional fact review doctrine appears to have played a role in the Court's
endorsement of non-deferential review in both Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657,
1662 (1996) (emphasizing that deference to district judges would violate rule of law principles
by making the scope of the Fourth Amendment turn on the conclusions of individual judges)
and Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 467 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of law
declaration function of independent review in the Miranda self-incrimination context, and
citing Monaghan, supra).
235 See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988) (explaining that where a
particular class of district court decision typically produces substantial liability, "one might
expect it to be reviewed more intensively" than the abuse of discretion standard the Court
adopted in that case).
236 See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 5 ("[Tihe almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.").
237 See id. at 75-85.
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The contention that sentencing is not regulated by rules of "law" subject to
appellate review is an argument for, not against, a system of appeals. The
"common law" is, after all, a body of rules evolved through the process of
reasoned decision of concrete cases, mainly by appellate ourts.... One way
to begin to temper the capricious unruliness of sentencing is to institute the
right of appeal, so that appellate courts may proceed in their accustomed
fashion to make law for this grave subject.238
He concluded that appellate review of sentences is "one step toward the rule of
law in a quarter where lawless and unchecked power has reigned too long." 239
Congress expressed similar views regarding the problems of discretionary
sentencing, and the appropriate solution to those problems. The legislative
history of the SRA emphasized the absence of a body of sentencing law as the
underlying cause of unwarranted disparities in sentencing. 240 It also indicated
that Congress intended the Guidelines to operate as the basis for an evolving
law of federal sentencing, which would develop through the traditional exercise
of appellate review.241 It explained: "Appellate review of sentences is essential
to assure that the guidelines are applied properly and to provide case law
development of the appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines.
This, in turn, will assist the Sentencing Commission in refining the sentencing
guidelines as the need arises." 242
In short, the essence of the Guidelines scheme is the creation and
enforcement of a rule of law in sentencing. As the Senate Report language
quoted above implies, the development of guiding principles is particularly
important in the departure context, where the usual centripetal force of the
Guidelines sentencing ranges does not operate. That is why Congress tightly
constrained the sentencing judge's departure role by a statutory directive
requiring, as a prerequisite to lawful departure, both the presence of unusual
circumstances not adequately considered in the existing guidelines and a
determination that those circumstances warrant a sentence different from that
authorized by the Guidelines. 243 The Koon Court's assertion that the decision to
238 Id. at 84.
2 39 Id. at 85.
240 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3224 ("The absence of a comprehensive Federal sentencing law and of statutory guidance on
how to select the appropriate sentencing option creates inevitable disparity in the sentences
which courts impose on similarly situated defendants.").
241 See id. at 150-51.
242 Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
243 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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depart "embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court" is
thus highly misleading-departure is discretionary in the sense that the
sentencing judge is never, regardless of the facts, required to depart.244
However, the choice to depart is not discretionary in that the judge is not
authorized to depart without making the two determinations outlined above,
with appropriate reasons, subject to appeal. This structure was designed to
permit the development of a jurisprudence of departure-principles of law to
guide sentencing judges in future potential departure cases.
Independent appellate review of the validity of the sentencing judge's
determination fosters the articulation and development of generally applicable
principles of departure jurisprudence.245 Highly deferential review, by
definition, does not. Such review presumes the essentially ad hoc, fact-bound
nature of the question presented.246
Independent appellate review of the validity of departure factors also serves
important rule of law interests by controlling the exercise of departure authority
by district judges. Appellate review serves as an important check on the
inappropriate use of departure authority and thus furthers the central goal of the
SRA-the reduction in unwarranted sentencing disparities. 247
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the Koon Court's reliance on Pierce
and Cooter & Gell was misplaced. Each of the critical factors pointing toward
an abuse of discretion standard in those cases is absent from departure review.
Departure is not a litigation management determination, based in part on off-
244 Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046 (1996). That is, the discretionary
decision not to depart is completely discretionary in that such a decision is not subject to
appeal. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
245 See supra Part lll.B.2.a.
246 See, e.g., Cooter & GeU1 v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) ("An
appellate court's review of whether a legal position was reasonable or plausible enough under
the circumstances is unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts; nor will it clarify
the underlying principles of law."); see also Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662
(1996) (explaining that highly deferential review is inconsistent with development of legal
principles).
247 This highlights a central argument in Ornelas, which emphasized that de novo
review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations was necessary in part to
promote equal treatment among similarly situated defendants. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662
(stating that deferential review would permit different conclusions as to the scope of the
Fourth Amendment by different trial judges, a result "inconsistent with the idea of a unitary
system of law"). Although Congress recognized the utility of avoiding a completely
mechanical sentencing structure, it also recognized that excessively frequent resort to
departures, or use of departures in inappropriate circumstances, would introduce into federal
sentencing the unwarranted disparities the Guidelines were designed to correct. See S. REP.
No. 98-225, at 150-51 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333-34 (describing
reasoning for placing limits on departure).
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the-record factors, which risks spawning satellite litigation.248 Nor is it,
contrary to the Court's assertion, the type of "multifarious and novel"
determination to which Professor Rosenberg referred,249 that can be reviewed
only deferentially. Both Pierce and Cooter & Gell involved amorphous
underlying legal standards, making independent review difficult.250 Those cases
might be analogous to the issue in Koon if the SRA permitted sentencing judges
to depart from the Guidelines upon a determination that such a departure would
be "reasonable" in light of relevant guidelines provisions. This is, of course,
not how the departure authority is framed. Rather, as the Court explained in
Williams, the validity of departure grounds are questions of the correct
application of the Guidelines, which involve analyses of the language, structure
and purpose of the Guidelines. 251 Such analyses, which closely resemble
statutory interpretation, implicate the types of rule of law interests the Court
found in Omelas and Thompson to dictate independent review.
In addition to its misleading characterization of the nature of the departure
determination, Koon emphasized the special role of the sentencing judge aiding
the Commission's task of reviewing and revising the Guidelines, and contended
that this role would be facilitated by deferential review of departures.2 52 This
argument is unpersuative. The Commission has not been deprived of
information arising from the reactions of sentencing judges to individual cases
as a result of the prevailing Diaz-Villafane standard. Indeed, precisely the
opposite is true. There is no evidence that sentencing judges have been
discouraged from departing in appropriate cases by the prospect of de novo
review; they also quite often explain why they feel constrained to refrain from
departing under certain circumstances. 253 Information problems are more likely
248 See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 179, 191 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 188 and accompanying text (describing EAJA determination as
whether the government's litigation position was "substantially justified"); note 195 and
accompanying text (describing Rule 11 determination as one of "reasonable inquiry").
251 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
252 See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996) (explaining that non-
deferential review of sentencing judges' assessments of the unusualness of particular cases
"'would risk depriving the Sentencing Commission of an important source of information,
namely, the reactions of the trial judge to the fact-specific circumstances of the case'")
(quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993)).
253 See, e.g., United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting
that the district court believed "it could not base a departure on the prevalence of alcohol
abuse on Indian reservations"); United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 479-80 (3d Cir.
1989) (acknowledging that the district court concluded that it was precluded from departing
based on mitigating factors).
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to arise if appellate courts adopt an exceedingly deferential approach to
departure review. The Commission typically has closely scrutinized appellate
opinions in analyzing potential amendments relating to departure practices.25 4 If
simple holdings to the effect that "the district court did not abuse its discretion"
become commonplace, circuit-wide legal principles will not coalesce, and the
Commission will have less to work with than under the pre-Koon regime.
In short, independent appellate review of departure decisions furthers a
core function of the Guidelines by promoting the development of a
jurisprudence of departure, a body of principles to guide sentencing judges in
deciding whether the circumstances of a given case might warrant departure. In
addition, independent appellate review furthers the Guidelines' goal of reducing
unwarranted sentencing disparities by serving as a check on inappropriate
exercises of sentencing judge discretion. The dicta in Koon emphasizing the
discretionary nature of district court departure decisions and the limited scope
of appellate departure review is inconsistent with the structure, nature and
purposes of departure and appellate review under the Guidelines.
IV. REACTING TO KooN-THE NECESSITY OF THOUGHTFUL APPELLATE
RESPONSE
I argued in the preceding section that significant portions of the Court's
analysis in Koon were flawed. Neither the Court's arguments from 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 and congressional intent, nor the Court's institutional competence
argument, supports adoption of an abuse of discretion standard for appellate
The Court's argument in Koon also ignores the fact that sentencing judges communicate
their views about particular guidelines provisions in ways other than their judicial decisions.
Correspondence to the Commission and interaction with Commissioners and staff at
workshops and Sentencing Institutes is a major source of information for the Commission.
254 The Commission often has amended the Guidelines to address particular appellate
decisions, particularly where circuit splits have arisen. Some examples include Commission
amendment 466, inserting policy statement 5H1.12, U.S. SENTENCING GUDEUNS MANUAL
§ 51I1.12 (1997) (prohibiting downward departure on the basis of lack of guidance as a youth
and similar circumstances) (cf. United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099-102 (9th Cir.
1991) ("youthful lack of guidance" is a mitigating circumstance justfying departure),
overnded on other grounds by United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1993));
amendment 486 to the application notes to § 2D1.1, U.S. SENT.ECING GuiDEL s MANUAL
§ 2D1.1 application note 15 (1997) (providing for a downward departure for certain types of
drug sentencing manipulation or sentencing entrapment) (cf United States v. Williams, 954
F.2d 668, 672 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting as a matter of law defendant's sentencing
entrapment theory)); amendment 487 to the commentary of § 2D1.1, U.S. SENTENCING
GuiDEuNEs MANUAL § 2DI.1(c)(D) (1997) (stating that the term "cocaine base" as used in
the Drag Quantity Table means "crack") (Cf. United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d
Cir. 1992) (stating that cocaine base is not synonymous with crack)).
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review of departures. Moreover, the Court's dicta extolling departure as a
manifestation of the individual sentencing judge's residual discretion under the
Guidelines is highly misleading. At the margins, these errors are potentially
damaging to central purposes of the Guidelines.255 However, the extent of this
damage (and, to a certain extent, the force of my critique in section EDi) may be
blunted by the ambiguity inherent in that standard, and the lack of clarity
associated with the Court's analysis that I criticized in section II. That is,
because one could reasonably interpret Koon's abuse of discretion standard to
encompass much of the pre-Koon appellate review, it may effect little change
(and therefore impose little damage). It all depends on how the courts of
appeals apply the standard. This section briefly canvasses the appellate reactions
to Koon and offers some guidance to the appellate courts in performing their
role in the Guidelines departure scheme after Koon.
A. Revolutionary Change, or Same Old, Same Old?
The early commentary on Koon was remarkably mixed. Depending on
one's point of view, Koon represented (1) a momentous change in Guidelines
jurisprudence;256 (2) an inconsequential tinkering with the process of departure
review;257 or (3) an enigma, with effects that could not be readily
determined. 258 How the appellate courts characterize Koon as changing or not
255 1 emphasize that this damage is at the margins, because the vast majority of
Guidelines cases are unlikely to be affected by Koon. See, e.g., UNrED STATES SNTENCING
CoMMissioN, 1995 ANNuAL REPORT 89 tbl.31 (showing that departures other than those for
substantial assistance to the authorites under § 5K1.1 accounted for less than 10% of
Guidelines cases in fiscal year 1995).
256 See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 1996) (Evans, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Koon "greatly alters the landscape" of appellate departure review,
and constitutes a "monumental change" which "casts a pall over all of our earlier departure
jurisprudence"); Abraham L. Clott, An Assistant Public Defender Responds to Koon, 9 Fed.
Sent. Rep. (Vera Inst. of Justice) 25, 25 (1996) (stating that "[o]nly the most plainly illegal
departures should fail" under the deferential standard adopted in Koon); Paul J. Hofer et al.,
Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v. U.S., 9 Fed. Sent. Rep. (Vera Inst. of Justice)
284, 284 (1997) (noting that Koon "appeared to be the most important development in the
area of departures since the implementation of the sentencing guidelines").
257 See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 Fed. Sent.
Rep. (Vera Inst. of Justice) 14, 14 (1996) (arguing that "a thorough and candid assessment of
Koon requires the conclusion that it has not changed matters significantly, and perhaps not at
all"); see also United States v. Dutchie, No. 95-4052, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17524, at *10
(10th Cir. July 17, 1996) (concluding that Koon does not alter the three-tiered departure
review process previously applied by most appellate courts).
258 See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, m]1, Places in the Heartland: Departure Juisprudence
After Koon, 9 Fed. Sent. Rep. (Vera Inst. of Justice) 19, 19 (1996) (explaining that "it is
1746 [Vol. 58:1697
DISCRENON AAD THE RULE OF LA W
changing departure review is, however, less important than how they apply it.
An examination of departure review practice after Koon reveals contrasting
approaches to applying the teachings of that case.
Some appellate courts appear to have taken to heart the language
emphasizing sentencing judge discretion and the need for appellate deference.
Take, for example, United States v. Rioux. 259 In Riozx, an elected local official
was convicted of several offenses involving extortion under color of official
right. The sentencing judge imposed a substantial downward departure, based
on the defendant's medical condition and past history of charitable deeds. 260
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provided some
indication of the nature and intensity of its review by stating at the outset that it
would "review the district court's decision to depart from the applicable
guideline sentencing range only for an abuse of discretion." 261 It then
proceeded to find no abuse of discretion after a perfunctory discussion.262
That court engaged in a similar approach in United States v. Ga/ante.2 63 In
that case, the court affirmed a downward departure from a GSR of forty-six to
fifty-seven months to a sentence of probation (with home detention
conditions), 264 based on the sentencing judge's determination that the
virtually impossible to predict the practical effect of Koon on the daily work of the lower
federal courts").
259 97 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996).
260 See id. at 662-63.
26 1 Id. (emphasis added).
262 The entire discussion in support of the departure was as follows:
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Rioux's case
differed significantly from the heartland of guidelines cases. Rioux had a kidney
transplant over 20 years ago, and his new kidney is diseased. Although his kidney
function remains stable, he must receive regular blood tests and prescription medicines.
As a complication of the kidney medications, Rioux contracted a bone disease requiring
a double hip replacement. Although the replacement was successful, it does require
monitoring. While many of Rioux's public acts of charity are not worthy of
commendation, he unquestionably has participated to a large degree in legitimate fund
raising efforts. Of particular moment are Rioux's efforts to raise money for the Kidney
Foundation.
It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that, in
combination, Rioux's medical condition and charitable and civic good deeds
warranted a downward departure.
Id. at663.
263 Ill F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997).
2 64 See id. at 1032.
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defendant's family circumstances were extraordinary. 265 The court emphasized
its extreme deference to the district court on several occasions, characterizing
the central question in the case-whether the family hardship was sufficiently
exceptional to take the case out of the heartland-as a "subjective" question,
"resting in the eye of the beholder," with the sentencing judge serving as the
requisite beholder. 266
A similarly expansive view of the impact of Koon is found in the Ninth
Circuit's en bane decision in United States v. Sablan,267 in which the court
affirmed an upward departure that was based, in part, on the need to deter
similar conduct in the relevant geographic area.268 Not only did the court
uphold the validity of the departure on the basis of very limited discussion,269 it
held that earlier circuit case law requiring sentencing judges to justify the extent
of individual departures through analogy to existing guidelines provisions was
no longer good law after Koon, a clear over-reading of that case, which did not
purport to change the level of deference accorded the review of departure
degree. 270
265 See id. at 1031. The defendant was married, with two children, ages eight and nine,
and had a disabled father. Both Galante and his wife worked, and there was evidence that the
family would be devastated financially were Galante to be imprisoned. See id. at 1032.266 Id. at 1032-34. The court also stated that the test for whether the district judge
abuses her discretion is "whether the circumstances relied upon to justify a downward
departure are so far removed from those found exceptional in existing case law that the
sentencing court may be said to be acting outside permissible limits." Id. at 1036.
267 114 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
268 See id. at 918. The defendant was given a live hand grenade by a friend, and
instructed to throw it into a nearby police headquarters, in order to create a diversion to
facilitate a robbery. See id. at 914. Instead, the defendant instead tossed the grenade into a
Post Office parking lot adjacent to the police building, where it exploded, injuring several
bystanders and causing damage to the Post Office and nearby automobiles. See id. Sablan
entered a plea of guilty to maliciously damaging a Post Office with an explosive, in violation
of a federal statute. See id. at 914-15.
The sentencing judge departed upward from the applicable GSR, citing significant
physical injury, see U.S. SENTENCING GuImELIEs MAr.uA § 5K2.2 (1997), property
damage, see id. § 5K2.5, and the need for deterrence in light of the fact that Sablan's partner
was in possession of additional grenades. See Sablan, 114 F.3d at 917-18.
269 See Sablan, 114 F.3d at 917. The dissent convincingly criticized the Sab/an majority
for failing adequately to consider the structure and theory of the relevant guidelines and the
Guidelines as a whole in upholding deterrence as a ground for departure. See id. at 921
(Tashima, J., dissenting).
270 Again, the dissent argued convincingly that under United States v. Lira-Barraza, 897
F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1990), degree of departure already was reviewed under a deferential
standard left unchanged by Koon. See Sablan, 114 F.3d at 919-20; see also United States v.
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In contrast, analysis of other appellate cases suggests a business-as-usual
approach to Koon. For example, a series of post-Koon cases from the Fourth
Circuit reveal a departure review process which does not appear to differ
materially from pre-Koon practice. In United States v. Weinberger,271 the court
rejected the sentencing judge's reliance on a civil forfeiture judgment in excess
of the amount owed the government as a basis for downward departure.272
Citing section 5E1.4 of the Guidelines, the court concluded that the
Commission "considered forfeiture when creating the guideline ranges for
terms of imprisonment," implicitly rejecting that as a pertinent factor in
determining the proper sentence. 273 Consequently, it treated reliance on
forfeiture as an "error of law," which is, "by definition," an abuse of
discretion. 274
The Fourth Circuit applied a similar approach to departure review in
United States v. Hairston,275 in rejecting a downward departure based on the
defendant's "extraordinary restitution" to the victim of her embezzlement
scheme. 276 Relying on prior case law and the structure and purposes of the
relevant guidelines provisions, it held that the timing, motive and source of
money for the restitution payment, in light of existing appellate case law,
precluded the sentencing judge from permissibly finding that the defendant's
restitution was "extraordinary.' 277
Cali, 87 F.3d 571, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that Koon did not change existing case law
regarding appellate review of extent of departure).
27191 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
272 See id. at 645.
273 Id. (quoting United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1397 (3d Cir. 1992)). Section
5E1.4 provides: "Forfeiture is to be imposed upon a convicted defendant as provided by
statute." U.S. SmETENciNG GumImS MANUAL § 5E1.4 (1997).
274 Weinberger, 91 F.3d at 645 (citing Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-48
(1996)).
275 96 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 956 (1997); see supra notes
228-32 and accompanying text (discussing Hairston).
276 Hairston, 96 F.3d at 104.
277 Id. at 108-09. It concluded:
Accordingly, although we defer to the district court's greater experience, and
although we recognize that the district court sees many more guidelines cases than
appear in published opinions, because the circumstances of the restitution in this case are
so far removed from those found exceptional in existing caselaw, we hold that the
district court abused its discretion in finding Hairston's restitution provided a proper
basis for departing from the Guidelines.
Id. (citation omitted); see also supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in United States v. Rybicki,278 the same court reversed as an abuse
of discretion a departure based in part on the defendant's status as a law
enforcement officer, which, according to the sentencing judge, made his
incarceration "more onerous" than that of other offenders.279 Noting that the
sentencing judge failed to identify any circumstances (aside from his status as a
law enforcement official) which would cause the defendant to suffer
disproportionate punishment, it inferred from the Guidelines a lack of intent on
the part of the Commission "to shield law enforcement officers as a group from
the otherwise universally applicable effects of incarceration" 28 0  and
characterized the sentencing judge's departure as a "legal error."281
B. Unpacking Departure Review-Wat Is to Be Done?
While there is legitimate ground for disagreement about the precise scope
of appellate departure review in light of Koon, I would argue that the approach
embodied in the Fourth Circuit cases, while fundamentally faithful to the
strictures of Koon, is more consistent with the scheme envisioned by Congress
than is the reflexively deferential approach represented by Rioux, Galante, and
Sablan.282 The former appropriately acknowledged the legal component
wrapped inside the abuse of discretion standard. In most departure cases,
determining whether the Commission has adequately considered a particular
factor requires a close reading of the language, structure and purposes of the
relevant guideline and sometimes of the Guidelines as a whole, an analysis
which contains a substantial legal component. The same is true with respect to
whether a particular factor, even if not adequately considered, warrants a
sentence outside the Guidelines range. Therefore, appellate courts usually need
not defer to the sentencing judge's determination that a particular factor or set
of factors is meaningfully atypical for departure purposes.28 3 If the courts of
278 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996).
279 Id. at 758-59.
280 Id. at 759.
281 Id.
282 In Part In, supra, I assumed that the abuse of discretion standard in Koon was
substantially more deferential than the previously prevailing standard, and criticized the
opinion on that basis. However, Koon is not entirely clear on this point. See supra Part U.C.
In light of this ambiguity, it is appropriate, in my view, for appellate courts to interpret Koon
to permit non-deferential review of the validity of sentencing judges' articulated grounds for
departure.
283 The only possible exception is the so-called "encouraged departure," see supra notes
71-74 and accompanying text, in which the Commission already has identified a factor which
it acknowledges is not adequately accounted for in the relevant guidelines, and concluded that
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appeals keep this in mind, and are careful to review independently those
predominantly legal aspects of the departure determination, they can continue to
serve the crucial functions that Congress intended.
In contrast, the reflexively deferential cases provide no guidance at all to
sentencing judges in future cases. For example, the Rioux court did not discuss
what makes Rioux's medical condition or charitable deeds "extraordinary" for
Guidelines sentencing purposes. The court did not articulate principles
regarding the future application of the relevant guidelines provisions, sections
5H1.4 and 5H1.11. This opinion gives the impression that departure review is
purely ad hoc. Such review does not further Congress's goal of promoting a
jurisprudence of federal sentencing, and to that extent is subject to
condemnation. 294
V. CONCLUSION
Appellate review of departures is a central component to the proper
function of the Guidelines system conceived by Congress in the Sentencing
Reform Act. The Court's opinion in Koon is a potential impediment to this
function because some of the Court's language overemphasizes the discretion
retained by individual sentencing judges to depart from the applicable
Guidelines sentence and because the abuse of discretion standard embraced by
the Court could be applied in such a way as to result in virtual abdication of the
important departure control and law declaration functions of the courts of
appeals.
It is important that the courts of appeals implementing Koon understand its
limitations, despite the tendency to view the abuse of discretion standard as
providing for "hands-off' review. Those courts still have the obligation to
evaluate departures in light of the language, structure and purpose of individual
guidelines and the Guidelines as a whole, and exercise their statutory authority
to reject, in appropriate cases, departures that are inconsistent with the
Guidelines. While Koon should serve as a reminder to appellate courts of their
statutory obligation not to overstep their proper role and engage in appellate
fact-finding, it need not and should not be viewed as fundamentally altering the
relationship between sentencing judges and appellate courts with respect to
decisions to depart from the Guidelines.
the factor may warrant a departure. Here, the Commission already has made the interpretive
decisions, and the sentencing judge is making findings in accordance with this pre-determned
interpretation of the relevant guidelines. Such encouraged departures operate much like
offense-level adjustment which the legislative history of the due deference language indicates
should be reviewed at least somewhat deferentially. See supra notes 150-58 and
accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 220-46 and accompanying text.
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